Defeating the Taliban: One Joke at a
Time
by Sohail Inayatullah
(PDF
version of this article)
THROWING SHOES AT THE PRESIDENT
While there were many reasons for the Republican loss in the 2008
election, one reason was the ridicule poured on former President George
Bush. Whether by Jon Stewart's The Daily Show[2] or Will Ferrell [3]
impersonations, few could see Bush in any serious light. He had become a
comic figure, even tragic, such that a journalist in Iraq could consider
throwing his shoe at him. The story of "most powerful person on the
planet" had been transformed into "inept leader."
In the May issue of Time Magazine, Michael Grunwald reflects on
the future of the Republican Party and asks, "Is the party over?"[4] Who
can take them seriously, he argues, when some of their leaders believe
the Earth is cooling. The mockery began, argues Grunwald, when GOP
leaders, to counter President Obama's figures, released their own budget
figures. Unfortunately, they did not provide any numbers, data, in their
budget.
While the Republican Party may rebound if the Democrats overreach
themselves, fail miserably in Pakistan and Afghanistan and if the
recession becomes system[5] threatening, right now the terms of the
policy debate are being discussed within Democrats' terms. They are
defining the agenda.
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd used this approach to unseat John
Howard. Instead of debating policy, which he understood would turn the
Australian public off – seeing labour as overly intellectual - he
focused on constructing Howard as out of touch, and indeed dangerous for
Australia's future. When asked about Howard, Rudd remarked, "He used to
be captain average, now he is just an extremist." The damage was done
and then Rudd could move to a serious discussion of policy differences.
But first he had to reframe the debate.
TALIBANIZATION
Far, far away from Washington and Canberra in another land, the opposite
is occurring. It is the Pakistan government that is mocked, the
President Asif Zardari still seen by many as Mr. 10% and by most as a
lackey of the Americans, Barak Hussain Obama notwithstanding.
Pakistanis do not wish to fight their own; they especially do not wish
to fight fellow Muslims.[6] The Taliban, many believe, are pure,
virtuous, fighting the good fight. And when evidence to the contrary is
given, most Pakistanis assume the ubiquitous foreign hand theory. It
must be the Indians. We are innocent, they seek to destabilize us. The
basic tenet of social science – correlation is not causation – is
forgotten; perhaps never even learned. Moreover, the strategic discourse
– seeing all reality as conspiracy based …hidden motives, agents, and
governments secretly trying to defeat each other – dominates. Acting in
ways to lead to a better society, better health outcomes, increased
prosperity, greater community, are mirages. South Asian history from the
Aryan invasion to Partition has been brutal. Thus, it must be them. It
cannot be us. Given that we need to ensure that there are more of "us"
then "them," even if the 'us" includes the barbarism of the Taliban.
Creating change in a cynical population will not just result from
financial promises, since that is what citizens believe governments do
to placate them – promise money. And if the money – schools, roads and
water projects – is delivered, more money continues to create a feudal
dependency relationship, instead of feudal lord it is now the Islamabad
government – a classic child/parent bonding pattern (earlier it was the
British). Dependency relationships do not create long term economic
development, innovation, and certainly not enhanced equity.
Fighting and defeating the Taliban militarily is unlikely as well. They
are not trained in classical war – military formations in a land war
with clear command control vis a vis governmental hierarchy and
bureaucracy with the goal of holding territory. Rather, their training
is in guerilla tactics. Moreover, along with Al-Qaeda, they lead
globally in organizational innovation. Their organizational structure is
more viral and mobile then fixed. By being peer-to-peer focused with
some degree of command control they can quickly morph, being highly
agile and flexible. They also have ideology on their side believing that
they are destined to win. Finally, they are fighting in their own
territory.
Sri Lanka's recent military success in defeating the LTTE should not be
considered as a hopeful sign for Pakistan. Sri Lanka succeeded because
the Tamils had nowhere to hide. The Taliban can hide in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, in mountains and households. Certainly Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri
know how easy it is to disappear. And Sri Lanka did not have to worry
about civilian casualties whereas Pakistan and NATO must be concerned
about every civilian death.[7] Finally, the Tigers lost as they moved
from being a guerilla army to a conventional nation-state holding land.
The Taliban (here including Al-Qaeda) are unlikely to be able to hold
any territory, but they are able to hold Pakistan, and indeed the entire
world at ransom.
ASABIYA
Ibn Khaldun, [8]14th century founder of sociology, wrote that
it is asabiya or unity gained through struggle that forms the
glue of long term successful governance. Away from the corrupt cities,
the Bedouins toil in the desert or mountains fighting the harsh
elements. This struggle creates an ideological community, a profound
solidarity. They become brothers in the war. And religion adds the final
aspect to asabiya. [9] They become an unstoppable force, knocking at the
doors of civilization, unable to build but certainly able to destroy.
With asabiya on the side of the Taliban, what hope does NATO have of
defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan or in Pakistan?
And yet this is what they said about General/President Zia-ul Haq, that
he would rule forever. He governed Pakistan with an iron fist, was the
true father of the Mujahideen that fought and defeated the Russians, of
which the Taliban are the bastard children (and like all the ignored,
they desperately seek attention).[10] Most believed the General would
last forever. Yet there was one writer, Syed Abidi,[11] who argued that
one way to judge if a regime is about to fall is to listen and observe
how the masses talk about their leaders. He argued that ridicule was one
indicator that a regime was on its way out. Before Zia's death in a
mysterious plane crash, Abidi in his field work recounts the following
jokes.[12]
In the first, the President Zia is in Paris for a conference where he sees
a Pakistani women dressed in Parisian attire. He asks one of his men to
tell her that the President wants to see her. At the hotel, the
President invites her to his room where he chastises her for wearing
foreign clothes. He tells her to take off her french coat. She does.
"As a Muslim woman, how dare you wear a skirt. Take it off," he says.
She does. "Don't you know about Islamization in Pakistan, how you dare
wear such frilly underclothes. Take them off." She does and stands there
naked in front of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
"Now come embrace Islam," he says with his arms outstretched.
Clearly the alleged purity of President Zia-ul Haq was being questioned.
The citizenry understood that he was buttressing the Islamic right wing
so that he could stay in power …[13]
In another telling popular joke from the 1980s, both the Ayatollah
Khomeini and General Zia have an audience with Allah, each being allowed
one question. Khomeini asks if the Islamic revolution in Iran will be
successful. "Not in your lifetime,' responds Allah."And in Pakistan,"
asks General Zia. "Not in My lifetime," says Allah.
Everyone knew General Zia's Islam was sham, a strategy. Not so with the
Taliban. They appear to be above mockery. Perhaps it is time to use
humor to dislodge their claim to purity, their claim to be God's
warriors. Richard Holbrooke commented in early May that beyond killing
there was an important battle of communication. As he says: "The
Taliban have unrestricted, unchallenged access to the radio which is the
main means of communication in an area where literacy is around 10
percent for men and less than five percent for women." [14]
Holbrooke has wisely asked for funding to counter Taliban communication
supremacy. But what should be broadcast?
The answer to this comes from Steven Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner in
their Freakonomics: A rogue economist explores the hidden side to
everything.[15] Levittt and Dubner demonstrate how mockery became
the decisive tool in defeating the rise of KKK after World War II.
Intending to defeat bigotry, one citizen, Stetson Kennedy, decided that
he could de-legitimize the KKK. It was exposure to the Klan at an early
age that helped him make his ideological decision. His family's maid,
"who had pretty much raised Stetson, was tied to a tree, beaten, and
raped by a gang of Klansmen. Her offense: talking back to a white
trolley driver who had short-changed her."
This is a lesson the Taliban have learned well in South Asia – do not
tolerate any challenge to authority especially by females. Stetson
infiltrated the Klan and learned their success. First lynching worked,
as this threat kept the black population in fear. The Taliban have used
a similar strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, most recently in Swat.
Once Stetson had figured out the culture of the Klan – codewords, rules,
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, he embarked on a mission to
expose them. He first tried to expose their financial base. Then he
would tip off leaders of Klan activities. But ultimately, Stetson,
writes Levitt and Dubner, felt as if these were merely throwing pebbles
at a giant. Finally a new idea came to him, he chanced upon the Superman
radio show …he passed on all his secret information (on handshakes, what
they called the Klan Bible – the Kloran, interestingly enough) to the
producers, who had Superman take on the Klan.
Writes Levitt:
One Klan member coming home from a meeting saw his young kids playing in
the street.When he asked them what they were doing, he said they were
playing a new type of game, like cops and robbers but called, Superman
against the Klan. He said: they knew all our secret passwords and
everything …I never felt so ridiculous in all my life. Historians now
consider the work of Kennedy as the "single most important factor in
preventing a postwar revival of the KKK in the North. (65)
Unfortunately, while having some short-term military success, current
NATO/American tactics of using drones to kill Al-Qaeda and Taliban
leaders positions Americans as cowards. Write Bobby Ghosh and Mark
Thompson in their article, "The CIA's silent war in Pakistan":[16]
Ordinary Pakistanis …remain unconvinced that the campaign [using drones]
serves Pakistan's interests. The drones feature in anti-US and anti-Zardari
graffiti and cartoons, and are the punch line of popular jokes about
American impotence or cowardice: Asked why she's ditching her US
boyfriend, a Pakistani woman says, "He shoots his missile from 30,000
ft."
THE WAY FORWARD
While humor, mockery must be a central tenet of any long term strategy
against the Taliban, the way forward in Pakistan and Afghanistan is, of
course, multiple.
First, protect those who are willing to stand up to the Taliban.
Second, turn those who are killed, such as the journalist Mosa Khankhel
of Geo TV, into heroes.[17]
Third, develop radio shows, TV shows, cartoons that show the Taliban not
as courageous heroes fighting for the nation, but as those bankrupting
the nation, driving away investment, taking away jobs, removing the
ability of women and children to learn – driving Pakistan into poverty
just as the same time India rises to world stature. "Does Pakistan wish
to be the beggar, while India becomes the feudal lord," is the scenario
that needs to be told.
Fourth, over time once this has worked, then one can show their
atrocities. Says Supreme Court Advocate, Aitzaz Ahsan, "the whole nation
needs to see … the floggings, the digging up of the graves of our
saints, the burning of our girls' schools."[18] However, if images of
their atrocities are shown first, then cognitive dissonance will result,
and the population will see it as Pakistan government, American or
Indian propaganda.
Fifth, create an understanding of social science,[19] that is, challenge
the world of conspiracy theories with basic knowledge of causality,
validity, and reliability but, more importantly, go to a root
understanding of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are created by
the powerless, those who feel overwhelmed by processes they cannot
understand, that they do not have the tools to understand.
Sixth, continue to support democracy but not just at political levels
but economic levels too – micro credit, cooperatives, for example.
Remember: it is illiteracy and unmet expectations (poverty in one area,
incredible wealth in another) that create the recruiting grounds for the
Taliban.
Seventh, frame the debate within the terms of the syncretism of
Pakistani Islam. Currently, the Taliban and other extremists create the
framework; they use their myths and metaphors to define reality.[20] As
physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy, argues, "Many fear that to be seen to
protesting against the extremists would be seen as protesting against
Islam."[21] As long as the Taliban control the framework, other measures
will fail since Pakistanis do not wish to fight against muslims. Within
the conspiracy framework, the Taliban need to be constructed as
outsiders. But over time, this will not work since the self-other
division leads to long lasting problems of identity. Other frameworks
are required. Currently, the strategy is to see them as anti-national.
This may be enough but most likely language from Islamic history will be
required. Stories of other Islamic groups who stopped the rise of Islam
through extremism need to be told. And: the state needs to show and
demonstrate that it is pro-Islam, pro-Pakistan, anti-Taliban and neutral
towards the West.
Eighth, military action should be, and this is crucial, led by a female
general. There is considerable Islamic history that tells the stories of
valour of women. Fatima Mernissi's The Forgotten Queens of Islam
[22]stands out. Mernissi starts with Benazir Bhutto and then goes
backward in time telling us of the heroism of, for example, Sultana
Radiyya (Delhi, 1236) and of Shajarat al-Durr (Egypt, 1251). More
recently there was Malalai, an Afghan woman who led soldiers into battle
in the second Anglo-Afghan war.[23] An all-women's army would be better,
but that is unlikely. In either case, a woman general would challenge at
a profound level the Taliban's disowning of gender. And every skirmish,
battle won, would dishonor the Taliban amongst the other tribes. They
would not be able to epistemologically survive. Once epistemology is
challenged then ontology is easy.
ONE JOKE, ONE FRAME AT A TIME
The Taliban will disappear when they have been de-legitimized.[24] This
will not happen through war but by reframing this battle, taking back
the terms of the debate, moving from extremist to syncretic Islam. Humor
can be an outstanding strategy in communicating that the Taliban's
vision of the future is not in the interests of 99% of Pakistanis and
the world. Being mocked is what the Taliban are deathly afraid of (not
death). As religious warriors they wish to be respected, seen as strong
and as virtuous, brave in the face of every obstacle. They are not. A
new story has to be told.[25]
[1] I wish to thank Susan Deckhard and Dr. Patricia Kelly for editorial
assistance.
[2] http://www.thedailyshow.com/.
Accessed May 22, 2009
[3]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOjfxEejS2Y. Accessed May 22, 2009.
[4] Michael Grunwald, "Is the Party Over?," Time (18 May 2009),
18-23.
[5] As in the world capitalist system.
[6] Indeed, food, housing, education, peace and dignity are far more
important. Ultimately, it is not about victory and defeat but about
creating a better society, a deep rooted culture of peace and inclusion.
[7] NATO answers to its constituent governments and the citizens who
elect them not to mention the world press. Pakistan must answers to its
citizens. Collateral damage only convinces most Pakistanis that this is
not their fight but an American and European issue.
[8] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah. trans. Franz Rosenthal. N.J.
Dawood, ed. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1967.
[9] Johan Galtung and Sohail Inayatullah, Macrohistory and
Macrohistorians. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1987. See Section 2, Sohail
Inayatullah, Ibn Khaldun.
[10] A Jungian reading is obvious. Al-Qaeda and Taliban are the disowned
selves of the modernists. As they sought to shed religious history and
join the linearity of secular progress, leaving behind religion, the
disowned has come back, as it tends to, in pathological forms. For more
on this, see Hal and Sidra Stone, Embracing Our Selves. Novato,
California, New World, 1989.
[11] Syed Abidi, "Social Change and the Politics of Religion in
Pakistan." Honolulu, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Hawaii,
Department of Political Science, 1988.
[12] Sohail Inayatullah, “Mullahs, Sex, and Bureaucrats: Pakistan’s
Confrontations with the Modern World,” in Deepika Petraglia-Bahri and
Mary Vasudeva, eds., Between the Lines: South Asians In/On
Postcoloniality. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1996, 125.
[13] Syed Abidi, "Social Change and the Politics of Religion in
Pakistan." Honolulu, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Hawaii,
Department of Political Science, 1988.
[14] Paul Eckert, "Information war key to USA Pakistan strategy: envoy."
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090512/pl_nm/us_pakistan_usa_envoy_1.
Accessed May 13, 2009.
[15] Steven Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A rogue
economist explores the hidden side to everything. London, Alan Lane,
2005.
[16] Bobby Ghosh and Mark Thompson, "The CIA's silent war in Pakistan,"
Time (1 June 2009), 22. Not to mention the jihadi recruits the
Taliban gains from every strike gone wrong.
[17] Zein Bazrawi, "Journalist killed in Taliban Region."
www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/02/18/pakistan.journalist/index.html?eref=time_world
. Accessed May 20, 2009.
[18] Aryn Baker, "The Nation that Failed itself," Time (25 May
2009), 17.
[19] See the Council of Social Sciences in Pakistan.
http://cosspak.org/. Accessed 23 May
2009.
[20] For this approach to strategy, see Sohail Inayatullah, ed., The
Causal layered Analysis Reader. An Integrative and Transformative Method.
Tamkang University Press, Tamsui, Taiwan, 2004. and:
http://www.metafuture.org/causal-layered-analysis-papers.html. For a
similar approach, see George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant.
Melbourne, Scribe, 2004.
[21] Aryn Baker, The Nation that Failed Itself, Time (23 May
2009), 14-17.
[22] Fatima Mernissi's The Forgotten Queens of Islam Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2003.
[23]
http://www.garenewing.co.uk/angloafghanwar/biography/malalai.php.
Accessed May 22, 2009.
[24] A similar process occurred in the former Communist world. Most
recently in the non-violent overthrow of the Serbian leader, Slobodan
Milosevic. Daily protests mocking the dictator were instrumental in his
downfall. See the film, Bringing down a dictator. Directed by
Steve York. Available at:
http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/index.php
[25] As a brilliant resource of old stories, see Aisha Ahmad and
Roger Boase, Pashtun Tales from the Pakistan-Afghan Frontier.
London, Saqi Books, 2009.
