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[Eckersley, R. It’s the
Weltanschauung, stupid! The
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 August 2000, Spectrum,
pp. 4-5; The Age, 18
November 2000, News Extra,
p. 5.]
It’s
the Weltanschauung, stupid!
Richard
Eckersley on the good life
We are often given the
impression that we are experiencing such a maelstrom of change –
economic, social, cultural, technological, environmental - that the
challenge is to ‘wing it’: adapt as best we can, seize the
opportunities and try to dodge the dangers.
This is only partly true.
At the most fundamental
level, these changes are driven by our weltanschauung
– the worldview or world philosophy that determines what we
believe and what we do. Worldviews
are a hard issue to address because they are ‘transparent’ to
those who hold them. They
comprise deeply internalised beliefs about what is important, right
and good, and so how we should live and for what we should strive.
These beliefs become unquestioned assumptions.
The modern Western worldview
is dominated by notions of progress - of making life better - that
are becoming increasingly global in their influence.
Progress is defined in largely material terms – a rising
standard of living - and measured as growth in (per capita) Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Economic
growth is the driving dynamic of modern societies.
Current government policy is underpinned by the belief that
wealth creation comes first because it increases our capacity to
meet other, social objectives.
This is a model of progress as a pipeline: pump more wealth
in one end and more welfare or well-being flows out the other.
By this standard, Australia
is doing very well. Australians
are, on average and in real terms, about five times richer now than
at the turn of the last century.
If we maintain economic growth at over 4 per cent a year -
the Commonwealth Government’s stated ‘overriding aim’ - we
will be twice as rich as we are now in about 20 years’ time, and
so ten times richer than we were 100 years ago.
There are several things
deeply wrong with this view of growth as progress.
It is, at the global level, ecologically unsustainable and
grossly inequitable. The
World Wide Fund for Nature estimates that global consumption
pressure, a measure of the impact of people on natural ecosystems
based on resource consumption and pollution data, is increasing by
about 5 per cent a year; at this rate, it will double in about 15
years. About 200 years
ago, the average income in the richest country of the world was
about three times that in the poorest; today it more than 70 times
greater.
However, I want focus here
on another question: is growth actually improving quality of life in
countries, like Australia, that are already rich?
International comparisons show a close correlation between
per capita income and many indicators of quality of life, but the
relationship is often non-linear: increasing income confers large
benefits at low income levels, but little if any benefit at high
income levels. Furthermore
the causal relationship between wealth and quality of life is often
surprisingly unclear.
William Easterly, at the
World Bank, recently analysed 95 quality-of-life indicators covering
seven areas – individual rights and democracy, political
instability and war, education, health, transport and communication,
class and gender inequality, and ‘bads’ such as crime and
pollution – over a time period from 1960 to 1990.
He wanted to see if, as he expected, ‘life during growth
gets better’. Consistent
with other research, virtually all the indicators showed quality of
life across nations to be positively associated with per capita
income.
Easterly then analysed the
data further to take account of various ‘country effects’.
As he says, ‘we do not want to know if life improves when
Togo becomes Denmark; we want to know if life improves when a poor
Togo becomes a richer Togo. To
his surprise, he found growth had an impact on quality of life that
was significant, positive and more important than exogenous shifts
for only a few of the 95 indicators (exogenous shifts are the
changes in an indicator over time when income is held constant).
While Easterly speculates
that the most plausible explanation is that there are long and
variable time lags that prevented the detection of the ‘true’
relationship between growth and improvements in life, he admits
disappointment: for the large majority of indicators, he was unable
to detect a medium-run improvement in life due to growth.
Life is getting better, he says, not primarily because of
growth, but because of time.
Quality of life is
subjective as well as objective; it reflects how people think and
feel about their lives as well as the social conditions in which
they live. Subjectively,
then, a better life is a happier or more satisfying life.
The founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, defined a good
society as that which delivered the greatest happiness to the
greatest number.
Some of the strongest
evidence for material progress is that the vast majority of people
today say they are happy and satisfied with their lives, and people
in rich countries tend to be happier than people in poor countries.
However, one of the most surprising findings of research into
what psychologists call subjective well-being (which includes life
satisfaction and happiness) is the often small correlation with
objective resources and conditions.
One recent estimate is that external circumstances account
for only about 15 per cent of the differences in well-being between
people.
Only in the poorest
countries is income a good indicator of well-being.
In most nations the correlation is small, with even the very
rich being only slightly happier than the average person.
That people in rich countries are happier than those in poor
nations may be due, at least in part, to factors other than wealth,
such as literacy, democracy and equality.
Another striking finding
is that the proportion of people in developed nations, including
Australia, who are happy or satisfied with their lives has remained
stable over the past several decades that these things have been
measured (about 50 years in the US), even though we have become, on
average, much richer.
It appears that increased
income matters to subjective well-being when it helps people meet
basic needs, but beyond that the relationship becomes more
complicated. There is
no simple answer to what causes happiness.
Instead, there is a complex interplay between genes and
environment, between life events and circumstances, culture,
personality, goals and various adaptation and coping strategies.
The evidence suggests that
people adjust goals and expectations and use illusions and
rationalisations to maintain over time a relatively stable, and
positive, rating of life satisfaction.
In other words, life satisfaction is held under homeostatic
control, rather like blood pressure.
This does not mean that social, economic and political
developments do not affect well-being, but that the relationship
between the objective and subjective realms is not clear-cut and
linear.
For example, Bob Cummins,
professor of psychology at Deakin University, has shown that under
normal conditions there is only a very weak relationship between
income or health and subjective well-being.
However, under adverse conditions such as sustained financial
hardship or chronic, serious ill-health, homeostasis breaks down and
well-being falls to below-normal levels.
The implication is that if we want to improve the happiness
of the population as a whole, we should focus on the worst off;
making the rich richer won’t make them happier.
There is another way to
measure people’s perceptions of quality of life: ask them, not
about their own lives, but about how they think people in general
are faring. These
questions yield much more negative findings.
In a May 1999 poll, despite the long economic boom, only 24
per cent of Australians said ‘the overall quality of life of
people in Australia, taking into account social, economic and
environmental conditions and trends’ was getting better; 36 per
cent said it was getting worse and 38 per cent that it was staying
about the same.
People were also asked
‘in about what decade do you think overall quality of life in
Australia has been at its highest’.
Only 24 per cent said the 1990s; a similar proportion chose
the 1980s and 1970s, with the ‘vote’ then declining through the
1960s, 1950s, and before the 1950s.
There was a good fit between how people answered the two
questions: most of those who chose the 1990s as the best decade
thought life was getting better; those who picked the 1980s were
most likely to say it was staying the same; and most of those who
chose the 1970s or earlier believed life was getting worse.
While personal quality of
life measures are positively biased, those of social quality of life
may be biased towards the negative - by, for example, the media’s
focus on bad news. Still,
there is evidence the social perceptions are grounded in real
changes in modern life. They
appear to be fundamentally about values, priorities and goals –
both personal and national – and the degree of congruence or
conflict between them. The
research suggests a deep tension between our professed values and
the lifestyle promoted by our weltanschauung.
This tension could be a key dynamic of life in Australia and
other developed nations over the next few decades.
Surveys show many of us
are concerned about the greed, excess and materialism that we
believe drive society today, underlie many social ills, and threaten
our children’s future. We
are yearning for a better balance in our lives, believing that when
it comes to things like individual freedom and material abundance,
we don’t seem to ‘know where to stop’ or now have ‘too much
of a good thing’.
Beyond the abstract moral
issues, surveys also reveal more tangible dimensions to our concerns
about ‘progress’ and its impact on quality of life.
We feel that: we are under more stress, with less time for
families and friends; families are more isolated and under more
pressure; a sense of community is being lost; work has become more
demanding and insecure; and the gap between rich and poor is
growing. All these
concerns are linked, directly or indirectly, to the ‘growth
priority’.
It seems, then, that
measures of social quality of life reflect social conditions and
trends that measures of personal well-being tend to mask.
Our social perceptions may be distorted by media and other
influences, and vary over the short term as personal circumstances
change and the national mood shifts.
Subjective measures are just that – subjective.
However, the evidence suggests the perceptions are not
distant and detached, but reflect deeply felt concerns about modern
life.
There are other streams of
research that also raise, although more indirectly, questions about
contemporary social developments and whether they represent real
‘progress’.
For
example, US researchers have shown that
people for whom ‘extrinsic goals’ such as fame, fortune and
glamour are a priority in life tend to experience more anxiety and
depression and lower overall well-being than people oriented towards
‘intrinsic goals’ of close relationships, self-acceptance and
contributing to the community.
Referring to ‘a dark side of the American dream’, the
researchers say that the culture in some ways seems to be built on
precisely what turns out to be detrimental to mental health.
Similarly, research by
psychologists Shaun Saunders and Don Munro at the University of
Newcastle has found consumerist and materialist values are
positively correlated with depression, anxiety and anger;
materialism is also negatively correlated with life satisfaction.
While these findings do not prove that materialism and
related values cause a deterioration in well-being, they do suggest
their cultural promotion is not conducive to it.
The cause-effect relationship is likely to be complex and
two-way. In any event,
these findings are hard to reconcile with the belief that continuing
material progress in rich nations is improving quality of life.
In essence, then, a
fundamental problem with growth, as it is currently measured and
derived, is that it is failing in its core objective of making life
better and people happier, at least in nations that are already
wealthy. This should
not be interpreted as an attack on economic and technological
development as such, but as a critique of the ends towards which it
is being directed, and the manner in which it is being pursued.
A key issue here is the
narrow focus on the rate of growth, rather than its content.
At present, government policies give priority to the rate,
but leave the content largely to the market and consumer choice.
Most economic growth is derived from increased personal
consumption, despite the evidence of its personal, social and
environmental costs. We
need, individually and collectively, to be more discerning about
what economic activities we encourage and discourage.
While such suggestions are often dismissed as ‘social
engineering’, this criticism ignores the extent to which our
lifestyle is already being ‘engineered’ by marketing and
advertising.
These issues need to be
incorporated into a new weltanschauung,
a new view of the world and our place in it, a new framework of
ideas within which to make choices and decisions, personally and
politically, as citizens and consumers, parents and professionals.
My sense is that if we removed growth – becoming ever
richer, regardless of where and how - as the centrepiece of our
worldview, things would fall into place, the tensions would be
resolved, a sense of coherence and balance would be restored.
This sounds much simpler
than it is. There is a
huge social inertia that resists this change.
As I said, worldviews tend to be ‘transparent’ or
‘invisible’ to those who hold them because of the deeply
internalised assumptions on which they are based.
And if individuals find change difficult, institutions find
it even harder, running along grooves cut deep by past ways of doing
things.
Both the necessity and
ability to change become clearer if we look at other times of social
upheaval. The great
social and political movements of the 19th century
shattered many assumptions of what was ‘normal’ at that time:
recurrent epidemics of typhus and cholera, child labour, the buying
and selling of human life, the appalling working conditions in
‘dark, Satanic mills’. For
much of the 20th century some GDP growth was traded off
for a shorter working week and a shorter working life; higher
quality of life meant lower growth.
If all of this is hard to
see within a ‘go for growth’ worldview, think of it this way:
given what you know about the state of the world, current social
conditions and trends, what you feel about your own life and what is
important to your well-being, would becoming twice as rich in about
20 years in order to consume twice as much be your number one
priority, your highest goal? No?
Well, for our governments, which we elect, it is.
This gives us an idea of the tensions being created by an
increasingly outdated and dysfunctional weltanschauung.
It’s time for new one.
Note:
The published version may include some deletions and other minor
editorial changes.
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