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Values
in End-of-Life Decision-Making:
Some Implications for People with Disability
Jennifer
Fitzgerald
The
rapid development of medical technology has created complex ethical
dilemmas for people with disability, their families and the medical
profession, particularly with respect to end-of-life
decision-making. This
article considers some of the values - such as materialism, mono-culturalism,
individualism and economic rationalism - which underpin current
trends in end-of-life decision making.
The author goes on to consider some of the implications of
the tacit acceptance of these values for the quality of life of all
people with disability, irrespective of whether their lives are
directly threatened by an end-of-life decision.
Introduction
"He
thought of his son, he thought of his wife - of Lakshmi slowly
wasting to extinction, of Dugald like a bright fiery flame suddenly
snuffed out. Thought of
the incomprehensible sequence of changes and chances that make up a
life, all the beauties and horrors and absurdities whose
conjunctions create the uninterpretable and yet divinely significant
pattern of human destiny."
(Huxley,
1964; 30)
At
the end of the 20th Century in the Western world, we find ourselves
part of a society which is less willing, possibly less than ever
before, to surrender to that "incomprehensible sequence of
changes and chances that make up a life" which Huxley
describes. We find
ourselves in a society more able, due to the rapid development of
technology, to control "all the beauties and horrors and
absurdities whose conjunctions create the uninterpretable and yet
divinely significant pattern of human destiny".
We also find ourselves in a society which is less prepared,
perhaps than ever before, to face the ethical issues which these
technological developments place before us.
Less prepared because, in a society of such rapidly changing
social values, there are few commonly agreed upon values which all
members of our society are willing to uniformly apply. The social
contract is up for grabs - possibly to the highest bidder.
We
find ourselves in a society where the ground is shifting so rapidly
that what is 'natural' and what
is 'nature itself' is undergoing profound transformation. Genetic
engineering, in vitro fertilization, antenatal testing, organ and
tissue transplants and life support systems are some of the
technological developments which have begun to challenge our
conceptions of 'nature' and 'natural'.
Life and death are no longer the definitive absolutes they
once were - they are increasingly negotiable variables.
The visions of Huxley's technologically sophisticated
Brave New World (Huxley, 1932) and Orwell's State-controlled Nineteen
Eighty-Four (Orwell,
1954) are no longer future flights of fantasy.
The
ordinary person can now be faced with highly complex moral and
ethical life-and-death dilemmas.
People with disability, family and friends of people with
disability, and professionals who are entrusted with aspects of the
care of people with disability are likely to be faced with such
issues at one time or another.
Some of these issues are:
·
Antenatal testing for impairment with a view to aborting the
foetus in the case of a positive test result
·
Withholding of basic nourishment and/or medical treatment to
newborns with disability
·
Withdrawal of life support systems
·
The making of 'do not resuscitate orders' for people with
disability, and
·
Euthanasia - including the question of advance directives,
such as living wills.
These
practices, directly and indirectly, threaten the lives and hasten
the deaths of people with disability.
Moral
dilemmas of this kind draw fine lines between 'right' and 'wrong'.
The challenge for both the individual and the society is to
determine exactly where that line is, when it has been crossed and
what are the consequences of crossing it.
At times, determining where that fine line lies is in itself
a difficult moral dilemma. For
example, where does the fine line fall when we consider the
distinction between prolonging life and postponing death through
life support systems? Where
does that line fall when we consider the question of parents
consciously conceiving a child they know is highly likely to have a
severe disability and the question of aborting a foetus on the basis
that it has an impairment? There
are many competing issues which pull at the person required to make
decisions in these areas. For
example, in deciding whether a premature baby should be given
intensive care treatment, Professor Max Charlesworth outlines the
following dilemmas:
"
. . . we are confronted with a situation where a complex set of
values is in play: the
sanctity of human life, the special symbolic position of defenceless
and vulnerable infants, the best interests of the child, the likely
future quality of life of the newborn, the professional
responsibilities of physicians and other health carers, and the
comparative costs of health treatment." (Charlesworth,
1993:38)
While
as a society, we have rapidly increased our scientific and
technological capacity, we have not simultaneously developed our
capacity, both as individuals and as a collective, for deep
reflection upon ethical issues.
Ethics committees suddenly began to spring up when we
realized that we were getting out of our ethical depth as scientific
advances, particularly in the field of genetic engineering, were
taking us to places we had not been before.
Questions were being asked which demanded an ethical maturity
which we did not have and at the bottom line was the urgent
question, "What should we do?"
The
trend towards non-imposition of one's values upon another, which has
been fed by individualism, has further muddied the ethical waters.
It is clearly not possible to ever be value-free - as
Steindl-Rast says ". . . not to choose is to choose.
If you say you are value free, you are only following the
dominant values" (Capra et al, 1992:172).
Nevertheless, the current unwillingness to state
values means that ethical dilemmas are frequently resolved in a
laissez-faire manner by the unfettered and unguided interaction of
social forces.
The
genome project in U.S., a project to catalogue all the genes of the
DNA molecule, and a project with broad ethical implications for
people with disability, is one such arena in which the participants
are willing to allow the ethical dilemmas to be resolved in a
value-free framework. An
article on Dr Francis Collins who heads the project alludes to this
value-free framework. "Personally
Collins is distressed by abortion, a common outcome of prenatal
screening for genetic defects.
Yet as a geneticist he honours a code of professional ethics
that demands he hide from patients his own feelings of right and
wrong. As the
discoveries of disease genes move from the lethal maladies of early
childhood to the lingering ailments of advanced adulthood, Collins
confesses an increasing level of personal discomfort.
In talks he gives on Huntington's disease, he invariably
shows a slide of the folk singer Woody Guthrie, "one of my
heroes". He goes
on to explain that Guthrie died of Huntington's, but he leaves
unspoken the terrible questions:
Was Guthrie's life not worth living?
If he had been aborted, wouldn't it have been everyone's
loss?" (Nash, 1994:31)
Value
Base of Current Ethical Decision-Making Trends
The
implications of our answer to the question - what should we do? -
are far-reaching, not simply in terms of the pragmatic question of
what we should do in a given situation, but more particularly in
terms of the underlying values, often unspoken and sometimes
unconscious, which shape the decisions we make.
The values which underpin the life-threatening and
deathmaking practices outlined above impact critically on the lives
of all people with disability, whether or not their lives are directly
at risk from these practices.
Let
us look, by way of example, at some of the values which underlie
antenatal screening for impairment.
Antenatal screening is routinely offered to pregnant women in
Australia. Selman noted
that in South Australia, maternal serum alfafeto-protein (MSAFP)
testing is routinely offered to antenatal patients and that it is
almost always combined with a screening test for Down's syndrome (Selman,
1994:650). One of the
main purposes of antenatal screening is to offer to the parents of
the child the option of aborting the foetus.
The overwhelming majority of Australians, according to
studies undertaken, support the abortion of a foetus on the basis
that it has an impairment. A
study conducted by Kelley and Evans and cited by Robertson
showed that 70% of Australians believed that abortion should
definitely be allowed when the child would be born with a serious
impairment (Robertson, 1992:13).
While no statistics are kept on the number of abortions which
actually occur on these grounds, it is generally accepted that a
significant number of abortions on the grounds of impairment do
occur each year.
Underpinning
this quite broad acceptance of antenatal testing and selective
abortion are certain social values which, although their acceptance
may be unconscious, nevertheless impact generally upon the lives of
people with disability. Materialism,
mono-culturalism, individualism and economic rationalism are
inextricably woven into the acceptance of practices such as
antenatal testing and selective abortion, and receive their social
validation and expression through societal acceptance of selective
abortion.
Materialism
Technology
and industrialization have given us an increasing control over our
physical world. Both
the process of production and the products of our labour have come
to occupy more and more of our thought space.
This has brought about a psychological shift in the way in
which we perceive the world and our place in it.
An all pervasive materialism has created the attitude that
all that is real and important can be held in one's hand and that
that which is real and important
- the product - is created through control and domination of
the production process. This
is such a marked feature of our culture that it has led to the
commodification of even non-material things such as ideas.
Questions of subjective value therefore become problematic
since they cannot be resolved through quantification or measurement.
Our
expectations for our own lives have become increasingly aligned with
our expectations for our products.
We demand the perfect product - and feel entitled to reject
the imperfect. In a
disposable society, imperfection is eminently disposable.
In rejecting the child with impairment, we are exercising our
'right' to perfection.
Materialism
has affected our thought processes, our perceptions, and our methods
of problem solving. With
this increasing emphasis upon quantification and domination of the
physical world, our capacity to process, synthesize and simply 'live
with' the unquantifiable, the metaphysical, the 'different' has
diminished.
Mono-Culturalism
While
human beings share the same essential drives and aspirations, the
way in which these are expressed through culture is multi-faceted.
Humanity has many, many faces, colours and forms of
expression. It is this
diversity which gives to humanity its unique beauty.
Yet, we in the Western world, seem afraid of difference.
We have failed to understand that one human culture can be
expressed through many different forms and have sought to impose a
sameness of expression - a mono-culture.
Our
wholesale acceptance of materialism has made difference and
diversity less acceptable as we strive to attain the perfect and
uniform product. We
seek to whitewash our world with a sameness which sanitizes and, in
effect, de-humanizes, humanity.
This desire to control the chaos of the world is as
destabilizing to a society as it is to nature.
"Chaos
is absolutely essential for the emergence of new life forms.
Chaos allows for the chance meeting of two previously
unconnected elements which could not have met in a totally ordered
world . . . Both chaos and diversity are essential to life and
therefore are inseparable from sustainability . . . Could it be that
those in the Western world are yet to learn that their survival
depends on social and cultural diversity and tolerance of some
chaos? Segregated,
regimented, mono-cultural cities are socially, and in the long term
economically, unsustainable . . .
Such
a mono-cultural existence impoverishes all those in the city . . .
The segregation of those who are elderly, young, disabled, poor or
from a different ethnic background is not so much to their detriment
but to society's. These
people have gifts to enrich the lives of others and society is the
poorer for not having them. These
gifts may not always be comfortable, and often they challenge
prejudices and assumptions. They
also throw a comfortable world into chaos.
But . . . it is chaos which provides the opportunity for
worlds to clash, new relationships to form and new life forms to
emerge. Such
experiences are an essential part of the maturing and growing
process." (Engwicht, 1992:26-27)
Individualism
and Individual Autonomy
The
social will to translate values of materialism and mono-culturalism
into action derives from the acceptance of individualism and
individual autonomy in our society.
In a society based more on rights (and less on
responsibility), the principles of individualism and individual
autonomy have risen to new heights.
"Certainly
freedom is promoted as a social, political and aesthetic ideal; but
what is hardly ever mentioned is the inflationary style that has
been paradoxically seen as the self's virtue . . . Within the
perspective of the dominator model of social organization, freedom
has become unconsciously linked with a conquest mentality and with
'hard' rather than 'soft' individualism - that is, with a notion of
power that is implied by having one's way, pushing things around,
being invulnerable."
(Gablik, 1991:64)
The
principle of personal autonomy shapes policy on selective abortion
in a number of ways - and from a number of angles.
The personal freedom of the
parents to choose not to have a child with impairment is upheld
as an important reason in favour of selective abortion.
This, however, clearly begs the question:
Who owns the child?
In
addition, it is also argued that the
child itself has a 'right' not to be born.
In this sense, it is seen as an infringement on the child's
personal autonomy to allow it to be born.
It is these principles which underly recent decisions by the
U.S. Courts to allow civil actions for wrongful life.
These legal actions deeply challenge society's acceptance of
diverse and 'imperfect' life.
A
wrongful life action is brought on behalf of a child born with an
impairment on the basis that had the child's parents been informed
of the child's impairment while in utero, the parents would have
aborted the pregnancy to spare the infant from pain and suffering.
The basis of the claim is that the child is harmed by its
very existence.
Interestingly,
similar cases brought in the respect of healthy children were
dismissed on the grounds that such a legal action potentially
damaged the child's self-esteem (Blumberg, 1994:9).
Such concerns have not inhibited Courts from allowing
wrongful life claims in the case of children with disability.
In
a 1983 decision, Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis Inc. (1983) 656 P. 2d 483, the Washington Supreme
Court, in recognizing that a right to bring wrongful life actions
existed, stated that "antenatal testing and genetic technology
provided benefits to individual families and all of society by
avoiding the vast emotional and economic costs of defective
children".
Such
applications of individualism fail to incorporate some notion of
interconnectedness between the elements of a society.
Capra presents an alternative notion of personal freedom:
"In
connection with our freedom, it helps to distinguish between the
individual and the person. An
individual is defined by
what distinguishes it from other individuals:
so many individual eggs in this crate; so many human
individuals in this population.
A person is
defined by the relationship to others, to other persons and to other
beings in general.
We
are born as individuals, but our task is to become persons, by
deeper and more intricate, more highly developed relationships.
There is no limit to becoming more truly personal . . .
Frances Moore Lappe has said something very significant.
When you define a person or personhood through the
relationships to others, she says, this means then that my personal
growth does not hinder yours. On
the contrary, it enhances it. If
I'm capable of relating more to everything around me, you will
profit from it, because I can relate then more to you, and this will
be your growth, and vice versa.
The conventional political idea of freedom, she says, is
elbow room. If I grow,
then you have to diminish, which is Newtonian:
where one object is, another cannot be.
The systemic view of growth and of freedom is one of mutual
enhancement. There's no
limit to it. It's not a
zero-sum game." (Capra et al, 1992:95-96)
Economic
Rationalism
The
expression of individual autonomy in a social climate characterized
by economic rationalism has had the effect of privatizing social
responsibilities. According
to Saltmarsh, "the adoption of a management discourse in the
bureaucracy . . . has led to creating a tension between the
rhetorical commitment to social justice and the tenets of good
management" (Saltmarsh, 1994:9).
People are increasingly gaining the entitlement to 'die with
their rights on'.
For
example, in the United States, health insurance cover for a child
was denied when antenatal tests showed the child had cystic fibrosis
and the parents decided against an abortion.
Health cover was only made available after legal action was
taken (Ballantyne, 1992:19).
The
human cost has not been reckoned in the economic rationalist's
analysis. London ethicist, Agneta Sutton highlights some of the
dangers of the 'inflationary style' of 'hard individualism'.
"This questing after a perfect baby could turn into a
nightmare for some people. The
attitude will be: you
chose to have this child, it is up to you and not the rest of
society to pay for that child's care.
The idea of imposing a form of quality control on our
children has dangerous implications."
(Ballantyne,
1992:19)
Conclusion
It
is when we begin to look at these deep ethical issues - particularly
life-and-death issues - that our values are deeply tested and
clarified. When
we, as a society, decide where we stand on some of these issues, we
are also making a statement about the values which underpin our
stance.
When
we state that we value classic beauty and perfection, we are also
stating that we do not value difference and disability.
When we state that individual autonomy is paramount, we are
also stating that we are an increasingly fragmented society with
less and less responsibility for each other, and less and less
awareness of "the essential intertwining of self and other,
self and
society"
(Levin, 1989). When we
state that social policy must be put through an economically
rational filter, we are also stating that human life has a price tag
attached to it. When we
challenge the 'right' of people who fall within certain categories
to live, we also challenge the quality
of the life of every other person in that category.
These
life and death issues challenge us to measure the gap between our
values in rhetoric - for example, the values of inclusion which
underpin anti-discrimination legislation and the Disability Reform
Package - and our values in action - for example, selective abortion
on the basis of impairment. It
is important for us to analyze and to understand those values which
stand behind the positions we take on certain of these life and
death issues, to be honest about what these positions say about
people with disability and their worth.
It is important because it is these values which determine,
not only whether people from certain groups are allowed to live, but
also the type of life which they have the opportunity to lead.
According
to Wolfensberger, "a society will devalue those who are
perceived as embodying the opposite of what it values" (Wolfensberger,
1992:8). In order to be
fully aware of the likely consequences of adopting certain positions
on these sanctity of life issues, it is important to understand and
consciously acknowledge the underlying values at work in our
decision-making processes. If
those underlying values fail to consciously welcome
and celebrate the very
life of a person with disability, then our social will to support
and include the life
of a person with disability must be deeply questioned.
References
Ballantyne,
A. "The Search for the Perfect Baby",
The Weekend Australian, Nov 7-8, 1992, p. 19.
Blumberg,
L. (1994) "Eugenics vs. Reproductive Choice", The
Disability Rag and Resource, Jan/Feb 1994, pp. 3-11.
Capra,
F. et al (1992) Belonging to
the Universe: New
Thinking About God and Nature, London:
Penguin.
Charlesworth,
M. (1993) cited in Ragg, M. "Lives in the Balance", The
Bulletin, June 22, 1993, pp.
33-38.
Engwicht,
D. (1992) Towards an
Eco-City: Calming the
Traffic, Sydney: Envirobook.
Gablik,
S. (1991) The Re-Enchantment
of Art, New York: Thames
and Hudson.
Huxley,
A. (1964) Island,
Ringwood: Penguin.
Huxley,
A. (1932) Brave New World,
London: Chatto &
Windus.
Levin,
D. (1989) The Listening Self:
Personal Growth, Social Change, and the Closure of
Metaphysics, London; New York:
Routledge.
Nash,
J. (1994) "Riding the DNA Trail", Time
Magazine, Jan. 17, 1994, pp. 30-31.
Orwell,
G. (1954) Nineteen
Eighty-Four, Harmondsworth:
Penguin.
Robertson,
P. (1992) 'Genetic Counselling', Interaction, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 13
- 15.
Saltmarsh,
D. (1994) 'Economic Rationalism or Something Else', Australian
Disability Review 2-94, pp. 3-11.
Selman,
E. (1994) 'Antenatal screening for neural tube defects and Down's
syndrome - the importance of pretest counselling [letter]', Medical
Journal of Australia, Vol. 160:
pp. 650 - 651.
Wolfensberger,
W. (1992) The New Genocide of
Handicapped and Afflicted People, Syracuse, NY:
Author.
Selective
Abortion and Wrongful Birth in Queensland:
Veivers
v. Connolly
Jennifer
Fitzgerald (B Ec (ANU), LLB (Hons) U of Q, Legal Researcher,
Queensland Advocacy Incorporated)
Published
in the Queensland Law Society Journal (April 1995), Vol 25 No 2 pp
189-97
Introduction
A
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Townsville - Veivers
v. Connolly (Unreported, Supreme Court of Townsville, de Jersey
J, October 13, 1994) raises several important issues which have
significant relevance for people with disability in Queensland. The
circumstances which led to this case involved a woman, Susan Veivers,
contracting rubella (german measles) in the very early stage of her
pregnancy in August, 1975. Her
doctor, Dr Kenneth Connolly, failed to positively diagnose the
rubella because he failed to perform adequate blood tests upon Mrs
Veivers when she presented herself to him with symptoms of rubella.
In April, 1976 Mrs Veivers gave birth to a daughter, Kylie.
Kylie was born with intellectual and physical disabilities as
a result of her mother contracting rubella in the early stage of the
pregnancy.
Mrs
Veivers sued her doctor, claiming that, because of his failure to
accurately diagnose the rubella, she had lost the opportunity to
abort the pregnancy.. She
claimed damages for the cost of Kylie's care and medical expenses,
and for the pain and suffering which she experienced.
Kylie also made a claim for damages, although her claim was
abandoned at the hearing. The
reasons for this will be discussed below.
Two
important legal issues were considered by the Judge in the course of
the case: first, the
legality of an abortion performed in the case of a pre-natally
diagnosed impairment of the foetus and, second, claims for damages
for what have been termed 'wrongful birth' and 'wrongful life'.
We consider these issues in turn.
Selective
Abortion
Selective
abortion is the practice of aborting a foetus on the basis of the
characteristics which that foetus has, or is presumed to have.
For example, in some countries, selective abortion takes
place on the basis of the sex of the child.
In many places, selective abortion is commonly used to avoid
the birth of a child with an impairment.
Advanced
techniques of ante-natal testing now allow doctors to predict, with
a reasonable degree of certainty, the likelihood of a child being
born with an impairment. Pre-natal
testing, of one form or another, is made available to most pregnant
women. Ultrasound
testing, which can detect some impairments, is performed on almost
all pregnant women; while more complicated pre-natal testing, such
as amniocentesis is routinely offered to women 35 years of age and
over, who are at higher risk of giving birth to a child with an
impairment.
That
selective abortion on the basis of the impairment of a foetus
commonly occurs is nothing new.
Indeed, it is the availability of the option of abortion
which gives to pre-natal testing a great deal of its purpose and
justification. The
practice of selective abortion on the basis of impairment also
apparently enjoys strong public support.
In the United States, 13 different surveys conducted between
1972 and 1987, consistently brought results of between 75% and 78%
of those surveyed believing that it should be possible for a
pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if there is a strong
chance of a serious defect in the baby (Singer, 1994:93).
While
there can be no doubt about the prevalence of the practice of
selective abortion, nor it seems of its general public acceptance,
the ethics of this
practice have never really been consciously, or deeply, considered
in Queensland. And
public support reached without deep social reflection ought not to
be taken as a mandate for any particular practice, particularly when
the practice involves fundamental questions of life and death.
It is usually when specific legislation is proposed that
public debate on the ethics of the practice proposed is generated.
In the case of selective abortion, the practice has evolved
and slipped into acceptance (largely as a result of advancements in
pre-natal testing), over many years, without either the legality or
the ethics of it ever being consciously considered at any very deep
level.
Queensland's
abortion law, which is contained in the Criminal
Code 1899 (Qld), s 282, authorizes an operation "upon an
unborn child for the preservation of the mother's life".
Under Queensland law, the predicted impairment of the child
is not a reason on its own for legal abortion.
In the course of his judgment in Veivers
v. Connolly, Mr Justice de Jersey was required to consider the
legality of an abortion performed on a woman who sought the abortion
because she believed her child would be born with an impairment.
For Mrs Veivers to succeed in her action, it was necessary
for her to establish, at the outset,
firstly, that she could
have legally obtained an abortion in these circumstances and,
secondly, that if a legal abortion were available to her, she would
have availed herself of that opportunity.
Mr
Justice de Jersey found in her favour on both of these points.
Queensland's abortion law, which allows an abortion to be
performed "for the preservation of the mother's life" has
previously been interpreted to allow an abortion which is considered
to be "necessary to preserve the woman from a serious danger to
her mental health which would otherwise be involved should the
pregnancy continue". In
Veivers v. Connolly, the
Judge had to decide whether continuing with the pregnancy in the
circumstances under consideration represented a serious danger to
the mother's mental
health. In deciding
that it did, he said (at p 8) that "continuing with a pregnancy
which would so likely result in the birth of a severely affected
rubella baby, entailed a serious danger to the [mother's] mental
health, albeit a danger which would not fully afflict her in a
practical sense until after the birth".
This
decision is important since it is the first legal recognition in
Queensland that the characteristics
of the foetus, as they are expected to impact upon the mother's
mental and physical well-being, are relevant factors to be taken
into account in determining whether an abortion can be legally
performed. This is
significant, particularly for people with disability, since it moves
the law discreetly over a threshold.
Over that threshold, not every child is equal, nor is every
child equally valued or welcomed.
Over that threshold, a woman has another kind of choice to
make. Not only does she
need to decide, "Do I want to have a child?", she must
also decide, "What kind of child do I want?". By placing a
window on the womb, pre-natal testing allows a woman to consider not
simply the impact of pregnancy on her life,
but the impact of this
particular pregnancy, knowing all the characteristics which it
possesses, on her life. The
effect of this Supreme Court decision is to give a greater legal
recognition to the use of this window in making decisions about
abortion.
Although
Queensland's abortion law still
falls short of the situation in some other jurisdictions - for
example, the United Kingdom
where the predicted disability of the child is enough of
itself to allow abortion, the door has been clearly opened on
selective abortion. Once
the characteristics of the foetus become relevant in any way in the
decision to abort, selective abortion has been sanctioned.
The Judge in Veivers
v. Connolly had no difficulty in predicting that disability in
the child would be likely to impact negatively on the mental health
of the mother and therefore to recognize disability (and logically
also other characteristics of the foetus) as a valid ground for
abortion.
This
is a conclusion which, it seems from the evidence given by doctors
in this case, most members of the medical profession would also have
no difficulty in making. Justice
de Jersey says, in the course of his judgment (at p 9),
"I
am satisfied that in Queensland, and in particular North Queensland,
as at the mid 1970s, were it known that a woman had been infected
with rubella in the early stages of pregnancy, therapeutic
terminations commonly occurred, provided the necessary certificates
and consents were obtained. The
evidence of Dr Salter, Dr Richards, Dr Doyle and Dr Pietzsch amply
supports that view. A
therapeutic termination could lawfully have occurred in this case,
because it was, as would have been gauged in 1975, necessary to
preserve the first plaintiff from the serious danger to her mental
health - and not merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and
childbirth - which would have been entailed were her pregnancy to
continue."
However,
it is important to be clear about the value judgments which underlie
such a conclusion and about the public policy implications of making
such value judgments. Why
was it so easy for the judge and the doctors who gave evidence in
this case to conclude, without any attempt at justification, that
the child's disability would so definitely damage the mother's
mental health. There is
an assumption that the bearing of such a child is a traumatic
occurrence. This
assumption is both fed by, and feeds, the negative public perception
of people with disability. For
example, in Mr Justice de Jersey's judgment itself, there are many
words and phrases used which convey a very negative perception of
people with disability. He
describes caring for Kylie as a "stressful, burdensome
task" (p 16), as an "arduous responsibility" (p 18).
He says that Mrs Veivers was "left to bear the child,
ultimately born with those terrible lifelong deficiencies" (p
2). He describes the
anguish which Mrs Veivers endured as "immense" and
"almost passing comprehension".
This
is not to deny, in any sense at all, the additional responsibility
and support needs of parents of people with disability, but in such
circumstances, a more appropriate social response might be one of
support, rather than sympathy.
It is important to question whether the perceived danger to a
woman's mental health is actually caused by the birth of a child
with disability or by the social context into which that child is
born, by society's unwelcoming attitude to that child and its lack
of support for the child's parents in upbringing that child.
The
impact of contextual factors on the way in which a mother might
perceive certain characteristics of her child is readily apparent in
the case of some Moslem women facing the prospect of giving birth to
girls. In most social
contexts, the birth of a girl child is a welcomed event.
Yet, for a Moslem woman the birth of a girl child could
significantly affect not only her mental, but also her physical,
health. Her husband may
beat her; he may leave her. According
to the criteria outlined in the Criminal
Code as interpreted in Veivers
v. Connolly, this would be a valid ground for abortion.
But on public policy grounds, would we really like to
sanction the abortion of a foetus on the grounds only that it is
female?
Queensland
abortion law has developed in a rather piecemeal manner, initially
by legislation, and then through judicial interpretation.
This piecemeal approach has led us
into the legal acceptance of a practice - that is, selective
abortion - the consequences of which have never really be considered
from a public policy point of view.
While
much of the debate in favour of abortion has been focussed upon the
woman's right to
choose, (in fact, it was these arguments which persuaded our
Parliament to enact the provisions which allow legal abortions to
take place), the debate has clearly avoided the quality of life
judgments which are now playing a part in decisions to abort.
According to Sinding Aasen,
"If
the question of who should make the decision is made the primary
issue, this implies that the material discussion on the ethical and
social aspects connected to 'quality control' of the foetus is
pushed into the background."
(Sinding Aasen, 1993:96)
Indeed
the focus on the woman's right to choose, also avoids some other
essential philosophical issues in the abortion debate.
As Singer states,
".
. . those who defend abortion on request do not describe themselves
as 'anti-life', or even 'anti-foetal-rights-to-life".
They prefer the term 'pro-choice', thus presenting the issue
as one about a woman's right to choose whether to remain pregnant or
not. They try to avoid
taking a position on when a developing human being first has a right
to life. This may be
good politics, but it is poor philosophy.
To present the issue of abortion as a question of individual
choice . . . is already to presuppose that the foetus does not
really count. No-one
who thinks that a human foetus has the same right to life as other
human beings could see the abortion question as a matter of choice,
any more than they would see slavery as a matter of the free choice
of slaveholders."
(Singer (1994), p 85)
Whether
we realize it or not, and whether we like it or not, the principle
of social equality is being significantly undermined by our
acceptance of the practice of selective abortion.
Veivers v. Connolly
recognizes that the characteristics of the foetus are relevant in
determining whether or not an abortion can legally occur.
The law has taken us this far.
How will we answer the next questions which are likely to
arise: Which
characteristics? Is the
gender of the child a valid reason for aborting the pregnancy? From
our example of the Moslem woman above, the abortion could certainly
be justified under the guidelines laid down in Veivers
v. Connolly. Is
disability a grounds for abortion?
What type of disability?
A hare lip, a cleft palette, a turned eye, Down's syndrome,
spina bifida? Then the question comes:
Who makes these decisions?
Who decides which characteristics justify selective abortion?
All of these are questions of degree which arise when we open
the door on selective abortion.
Perhaps this is one
door which should never have been opened.
But it has been opened and we have had the opportunity, at a
cost, to see the impact of what lies inside upon the principle of
social equality. However, the opening of a door does not oblige us
to leave it ajar. As a
society, we have the opportunity to discriminate between practices
(and values) which either celebrate or seek to oppress human
diversity.
"Seen
from the standpoint of the individual, it is neither unnatural nor
indecent to want a healthy and perfectly developed child.
An essential question, however, is whether the transition
from wishing to actually having the opportunity to choose does not
become a problem in a larger perspective." (Sinding
Aasen, 1993:97)
Peter
Singer, who advocates for the use of quality of life assessments in
all end-of-life decisions says this:
"Implicit
in the acceptance of prenatal diagnosis and abortions is both a
willingness to make quality of life judgments (that is, the judgment
that life with a particular kind of disability is not as desirable
as the life of a normal child) and an expression of the priority of
quality of life over sanctity of life, at least as far as the foetus
is concerned." (Singer,
1994:93)
Singer
is correct: prenatal diagnosis and abortion, used together,
inescapably lead us to making end-of-life decisions based on quality
of life judgments. However,
these practices deeply and significantly undermine the notion that
all human beings are of equal worth and value to a society.
They effectively introduce a quasi-caste system in which the
'untouchables' become the 'expendables' in all situations involving
end-of-life decisions.
Wrongful
Birth and Wrongful Life Actions
The
main issues before the Court, in Veivers
v. Connolly, were claims for damages for what have been termed
wrongful birth and wrongful life.
Wrongful
Birth - Defined
A
wrongful birth action is brought by the parents of a child claiming
damages for the costs of caring for the child and the emotional
distress they have suffered as a result of the child's birth.
Wrongful birth actions have tended to cover two types of
situations. First,
where a woman falls pregnant as a result of another person's
negligence - for example, in the case of a sterilization wrongfully
performed or a pharmaceutical prescription wrongly filled.
Second, where the opportunity to abort a child on the grounds
of impairment is lost as a result of another person, usually a
doctor, failing to diagnose an impairment.
In
Veivers v. Connolly, Mrs Veivers claimed that, had the rubella
been properly diagnosed when she first presented herself to Dr
Connolly, she would have elected to abort the pregnancy and thereby
been saved the emotional and financial costs of bringing up a child
with disability. She
claimed damages for:
·
mental distress and the destruction of a normal family life
brought about by her daughter's disabilities and the imposed
responsibility to care for her daughter, and
the financial costs associated with her daughter's care.
Her
claim was successful and she was awarded $906 040 damages, $50 000
of which was attributed to her pain and suffering.
Wrongful
Life - Defined
A
wrongful life claim differs slightly from a wrongful birth claim,
although it usually arises from the same set of circumstances.
A wrongful life claim is made on the child's behalf.
The child claims that, were it not for another person's
negligence, she or he would not have been born.
The child, in effect claims, that she or he would have been
better off if she or he had been aborted and therefore claims
damages for his or her wrongful existence.
The cases in which such claims have been made usually involve
a child being born with an impairment which, due to some negligence
was not detected prior to its birth and the parents, therefore, lost
the opportunity to abort the child.
In
Veivers v. Connolly, a
claim for damages was initially brought on behalf of Kylie, Mrs
Veivers' daughter, however, this claim was abandoned at the Court
hearing. It was
conceded that, in Australia, there was no legal authority for such
an action. The Court
relied on an English decision, McKay
v. Essex Area Health Authority (1982) 1 QB 1166.
That was a case very similar to Veivers
v. Connolly: the mother contracted rubella during the early
stages of the pregnancy, the doctor failed to diagnose the rubella
so that the mother had no opportunity to choose to abort the
pregnancy and the child was born with physical and intellectual
disabilities. The
English Court of Appeal there decided that there was no legally
recognizable action of wrongful life.
Lord Justice Stephenson said (at p. 1181),
"I
am ... compelled to hold that neither defendant was under any duty
to the child to give the child's mother an opportunity to terminate
the child's life. That
duty may be owed to the mother, but it cannot be owed to the child.
To
impose such a duty towards the child would, in my opinion, make a
further inroad on the sanctity of human life which would be contrary
to public policy. It
would mean regarding the life of a handicapped child as not only
less valuable than the life of a normal child, but so much less
valuable that it was not worth preserving, and it would even mean
that a doctor would be obliged to pay damages to a child infected
with rubella before birth who was in fact born with some mercifully
trivial abnormality. These
are the consequences of the necessary basic assumption that a child
has a right to be born whole or not at all, not to be born unless it
can be born perfect or "normal", whatever that may
mean."
The
Court of Appeal went on to point out that it was almost impossible
in any such action to ascertain the nature of the injury and the
costs associated with that injury.
Lord Justice Stephenson said (at p. 1181),
"The
only loss for which those who have not injured the child can be held
liable to compensate the child is the difference between its
condition as a result of their allowing it to be born alive and
injured and its condition if its embryonic life had been ended
before its life in the world had begun.
But how can a court of law evaluate that second condition and
so measure the loss to the child?
Even if a court were competent to decide between the
conflicting views of theologians and philosophers and to assume an
"after life" or non-
existence
as the basis for the comparison, how can a judge put a value on the
one
or the other, compare either alternative with the injured child's
life in this world and determine that the child has lost anything,
without the means of knowing what, if anything, it has
gained?".
Similar
cases have been brought to Court in the United States and almost all
have been unsuccessful. In
the first North American wrongful life case, Gleitman
v. Cosgrove (1967) 227 A. 2d 689, Chief Justice Weintraub stated
(at p. 711) that the child's complaint involved saying that he would
have been better off not to have been born at all:
"Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot
possibly know whether this is so.
We must remember that the choice is not being born with
health or being born without it. . . . Rather the choice is between
a worldly existence and none at all . . . To recognize a right not
to be born is to enter an area in which no one can find his
way."
While
not every United States court has rejected wrongful life actions ,
many US Courts, despite their renowned willingness to entertain
'creative' litigation, have remained unwilling to recognize wrongful
life claims. The public
policy implications are too grave.
These actions do not only threaten the sanctity of life
principle, but also deeply threaten any concepts of social equality
which we might espouse. To
judge that one person's life has so little value that she or he
would be better off had she or he never lived is to deeply challenge
the worth of that person's lived existence.
The judging of a person's life as of such little value is
hardly likely to compel caring and supportive responses from other
community members.
Wrongful
Life and Wrongful Birth - Are the Differences Merely Cosmetic?
While
the many US and UK Courts which have consistently denied wrongful
life claims are to be commended for their willingness to draw the
line at, effectively, imposing a duty upon one person to take
another's life, their acceptance of wrongful birth claims has
nevertheless opened the door on the corrosive social implications
which they were seeking to avoid in disallowing wrongful life
claims.
Wrongful
birth claims and wrongful life claims differ little in their
practical and public policy implications; their difference is of
more interest to lawyers. In
a wrongful life claim, the child is arguing that it would be better
off if it were not alive. In
a wrongful birth claim, the parents are claiming that they
would be better off if the child had not been born..
To allow such an action must seriously undermine a child's
self-esteem and sense of belonging and being wanted.
It must also seriously undermine our collective sense of
responsibility and caring for those people whose lives are deemed to
be so injurious to their parents' well-being.
It does nothing to remove the image which people with
disability must already fight against and that is one of being a
burden.
These
cases differ from other cases, for example, the thalidomide cases,
where the child's impairment is directly related to the negligence
of the doctor in prescribing medication which harms the unborn
child. Those cases are
like any personal injury case where a person who negligently harms
another must accept responsibility for that harm.
The only difference between the thalidomide-type cases and
other personal injury cases is that the injury occurs while the
child is in utero. In
wrongful birth cases, however, the negligence involved is the
failure to make available to the mother the opportunity to abort the
pregnancy.
From
a strictly legal standpoint, given the current abortion laws and the
way in which they have been interpreted, it is inevitable that such
an obligation would be recognized.
However, the public policy implications of approving
selective abortion have been given little attention and the issue of
competing interests between parents and children (especially where
the child has characteristics which are not desired by its parents)
have been glossed over.
These
cases are also of concern in that they give recognition, in some
form or other, to some kind of 'right' to have a
healthy/'perfect'/'normal' child.
From a public policy point of view, is it appropriate that
such a 'right' be demanded when nature, even transformed as it has
been by technological advances, cannot guarantee that to us without
actually having to impinge upon other cardinal human values such as
respect for life?
Wrongful
Birth - Implications for the Future
The
recognition of wrongful birth actions has certain disconcerting
implications for the future. First,
the value of people with disability to the community is seriously
undermined when parents can sue their doctors for, effectively,
allowing them to give birth to a child with disability.
This amounts to a statement, by society, that we do not want
such people in the world or, at the very least, we have the 'right'
to choose not to have such people in the world.
This must impact on all people with disability, not only
those whose birth is the subject of litigation.
Perhaps
a time will come when parents will be told that they cannot expect
support in meeting the needs of their children with disability
because they chose to
have the child when they could have had it aborted.
Such reasoning was actually used by a health insurance
company in the United States, thankfully unsuccessfully, to deny
health insurance cover to a child born with a disability when the
parents knew of the disability prior to its birth and chose not to
abort the pregnancy (Ballantyne, 1992:19).
Second,
with the responsibility to detect disability prior to birth and
place the option of abortion before the parents, doctors are likely
to begin practising more defensive medicine.
The number of pre-natal tests is likely to increase and,
therefore, the number of selective abortions.
Pre-occupation
with testing for birth defects increases the society's fears of
disability and positive images and experiences of disability then
become displaced by a paranoid 'seek and destroy' philosophy.
Wrongful
birth actions also place an onus on all doctors to actively promote
selective abortion by at least placing this option before every
woman who is found to be bearing a child with some kind of
impairment, irrespective of their personal views.
As we saw in looking at the law on selective abortion in
Queensland, there are no set criteria for such selective abortion
and, as knowledge of human genetics increases, we are likely to be
faced with a wider range of characteristics which are viewed as
undesirable and which doctors then become responsible for screening
out.
Conclusion
The
case of Veivers v. Connolly
has brought squarely before Queensland's judiciary the opportunity
to consider the practice of selective abortion and the right to sue
a doctor for allowing a child with disability to be born.
The Judge's decision reflects little recognition of the
public policy implications of these issues for the position of
people with disability in society.
It confirms us in our growing mono-culturalism and our
reluctance to embrace and welcome difference.
It also confirms our aggressive approach to controlling our
environment and circumstances to the point that we have now, in some
form or other, recognized a 'right' to a 'perfect'/'normal' child.
Such a hard approach to dealing with the diversity of our
environment cannot occur without someone being hurt - in this case,
it is those who are different.
It also cannot happen without re-defining, to some
fundamental degree, the intrinsic dignity of human life .
References
Ballantyne,
A. "The Search for the Perfect Baby", The
Weekend Australian, November 7-8, 1992, p. 79.
Sinding
Aasen, H. "What Kind of Children?
A New Content to the Debate on Abortion" in Hellum, A
(ed), Birth Law, 1993,
Oslo: Scandinavian
University Press.
Singer,
P. Rethinking Life and Death,
1994, Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company.
Smith,
G. Bioethics and the Law:
Medical, Socio-Legal and Philosophical Directions for a Brave
New World, 1994, New York.
When
'Quality of Life' Becomes 'Quality or
Life', It's Time to Challenge the Concept
Jennifer
Fitzgerald
An
edited version of this article was published in Health Issues
(1995), vol 42, 19-22
In
this article, the author challenges the use of quality of life
judgments as a criteria for medical decisions, particularly when
those decisions involve the life or death of the patient.
She notes that predicted poor quality of life is increasingly
being used to justify the termination of the lives of many persons
and argues that quality of life judgments undermine the principle of
social equality, a principle which is integral to a civilized
society. The author
observes that the criteria used in making quality of life judgments
reflect values of increasing disconnectedness and alienation in
society. She sees the
use of quality of life judgments to end lives as a symptom of,
rather than a solution to, social alienation and encourages the use
of more constructive, and less utilitarian, solutions to the
dilemmas which differing life qualities present us with.
Introduction
According
to Aristotle, ethics is not a mathematical equation.
He says that in solving ethical dilemmas, we must find a
method which is appropriate to the subject-matter.
We ought not, he suggests, pretend to a greater degree of
precision than is possible. Yet,
in a Western society, where science has become wedded to
materialism, where the 'objective' has overtaken the 'subjective',
where the rational has driven out the intuitive, and where we have
come to believe that we can both control and quantify the world
around us, 'formulas' for resolving the complex ethical issues which
technological advances place before us are seductively attractive.
Quality
of life judgments have become one such formula.
Predicted poor quality of life has become an important
measuring stick in many medical decisions involving the life or
death of patients. Ethical
medical dilemmas such as the rationing of health care resources, the
withholding of medical treatment from newborns with disability,
orders not to resuscitate patients, and the withdrawal of life
support systems often hinge upon judgments about quality of life.
But is quality of life something which may be objectively judged?
And even if it is, is it appropriate that quality of life be
transformed into an ultimatum:
quality or life?
Non-Participatory
Consciousness: Its
Dangers in Quality of Life Judgments
When
we judge the quality of others' lives, we often do so from a great
distance. In the
tradition of Western social science, the social scientist stands
back and objectively evaluates using a set of criteria developed
from where she or he stands in the world.
But place yourself
in
another's shoes, and the world looks very different.
Suddenly the criteria for quality of life changes.
I
recently attended a forum on euthanasia with a colleague who uses a
wheelchair. In the
course of a discussion on euthanasia, a middle aged woman of good
health and mobility in his discussion group asserted forcefully that
in the event that she were unable to bathe herself and attend to her
personal needs she would judge her life to be of such poor quality
that she would want the 'right' to die.
Yet this 'tragedy' which she described was the daily
landscape of life for my colleague.
Why, then, was it she, and not he, who was asserting the
right to die? As I
thought of my colleague and his life, I found it difficult to
describe it as tragic: full
of hope and aspirations, frustrations and achievements - little
different I suspect from those hopes and aspirations of the woman
who feared so greatly his predicament.
Lous
Heshusius acknowledges the importance of participatory, rather than
alienated, consciousness in research
and ethical dialogue. She
says that this involves a somatic, nonverbal quality of attention
that requires one to let go of the focus on self.
It requires a recognition of kinship and therefore of ethics,
a recognition of relationship between the researcher and the
subject. She says that,
for her as a special educationalist conducting a qualitative study
with people with disability, it meant confronting the power and
status differences that stood in the way of fully attending.
She was forced to recognize her upbringing, values, and
related emotions until she finally came to pose the question of
merging: could she
imagine such a life for herself?
It was only when she could start seeing the lives of the
people she was 'studying' as worthy for herself, or for her
children, that she could extend
herself somatically, forget the ego concerns that constitute the
self, and be fully attentive.
Many
quality of life judgments seek to employ 'objective' criteria.
However, the criteria themselves are highly subjective in
their application. If
those making the value judgments have not been able to merge their
own lives with those whom they are judging, their subjective
application is bound to be flawed.
They will be unable to place value on the life of the other
with whom they have no connection.
This connection need not be personal, but must be empathetic.
There must be a feeling for the 'object' of assessment.
The greater the empathy, the greater will be the appreciation
of value.
Peter
Singer, in his book Rethinking
Life and Death, quotes the mother of a baby born with Down
syndrome, but no other medical complications, as saying to her
husband, after receiving the news that the child had Down's
syndrome, but before having seen the child, "I don't want it,
Duck". She had not
yet had the opportunity to make any empathetic connection with her
child. Yet, in her
distance and her distress, her wishes were accepted and the doctor
ordered 'treatment' which ensured that the child died.
Participatory
consciousness requires a recognition of 'relationship'.
An empathetic relationship, with self interest acknowledged
and set aside, is one of the best protections of the interests of a
person who is not in a position to protect themselves.
Once a relationship is recognized, in some way, an additional
responsibility of care arises.
'About'
Rather than 'For' - the Creation of the 'Other'
Sadly,
the participatory consciousness which Lous Heshusius describes, and
which is essential to just medical decision-making, is not an
integral part of our Western culture. We are very capable of
distancing ourselves from all those with whom we share the planet.
In a post modern society, our interactions have been shaped
by our increasingly mechanistic view of life.
For example, our ecological track record is one of
dominating, denuding, controlling, and exploiting our physical
environment. The
descriptive language of our interaction with our environment does
not include words such as: 'respecting',
'living with', 'living alongside'.
We have lost our sense of intimate connection with our
environment and those who inhabit it.
We have managed to construct that with which we have no
connection as 'other' and therefore outside our range of moral
responsibility.
The
objectification of 'other' means that the essential
interconnectedness of life is denied.
Professor Wolf Wolfensberger, in his monograph The
New Genocide of Handicapped and Afflicted People identifies an
historical pattern of defining groups of people out of society, or
as marginal and devalued members of a society.
He sees that this is likely to occur if those people are
"viewed as non-human" or if they are "believed to
constitute a serious (real or potential) threat to the identity,
welfare or even
survival
of the collectivity, and especially of its more valued
members". He
argues that people are viewed in this way when:
·
they
are perceived as not looking or acting in a way that is congruent
with the perceiver's image and expectations of how human beings
should look and act
·
they
are perceived as subhuman for other reasons - for example, because
of a cultural stereotype
·
they
are perceived as wilfully antisocial
·
they
are perceived as burdensome and demanding to a disproportionate
degree, becoming significant obstacles to other people's pursuit of
their own goals, and
·
they
are perceived as constituting a serious threat to the status quo.
He
goes on to argue that the social judgments which place one person or
group of persons in the 'other' category are highly subjective,
being influenced by perceptions as much as by actualities.
This
culture of objectification, which is also an intrinsic part of
modern medical culture, allows
us to make decisions 'about' rather than 'for' others.
If our decisions are coming from a place of 'otherness', of
disconnection with the 'object' being decided 'about', the decisions
we make are unlikely to be safe, nor in the best interests of that
'other'.
Current Criteria for Quality of Life Judgments - Expressions of
'Otherness'
The
quality of life criteria currently used in medical ethical
decision-making, on the whole, fail to take account of the
subjectivity of life quality.
In a recent article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, Thomas Gill and Alvan Feinstein, review current
mechanisms for measuring quality of life.
They conclude that because quality of life is a uniquely
personal perception, which reflects the way that individual
patients feel not only about their health status but also about
other aspects of their lives - such as jobs, family, friends, and
other life circumstances - most measurements of quality of life
seem to aim at the wrong target.
They argue that quality of life can only be suitably
measured by determining the opinions of patients and by
supplementing (or replacing) the criteria developed by 'experts'.
Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, a German theologian, who witnessed at first hand in
Hitler's Nazi Germany the consequences of judging the value of a
life, highlighted in his book Ethics,
the extremely subjective nature of the application of apparently
objective criteria. He
believed that the distinction between life that is worth living
and life not worth living was a distinction which must sooner or
later destroy itself. His
prediction, sadly, has not yet come true.
In contrast, there is a lively debate raging as to which
criteria should be used in determining this very distinction.
Various criteria have been suggested for judging the value
of one human life as against another.
Broadly speaking they involve two sets of concerns:
•
the suffering of the family caring for the person, and
•
the plight of the person him or herself.
A
range of criteria, which relate specifically to the concerns of
the person whose life quality is being judged, have been proposed.
They include: hardship,
a meaningless life, pain and suffering, futile treatment, and the
possession of 'higher' human characteristics such as rationality
and self-consciousness.
Upon
a simple analysis, many of the arguments in favour of the use of
criteria such as these are persuasive.
They use the language of 'compassion' and 'caring' for the
individual. They
speak of decisions which are in the 'best interests' of those
concerned. Expressed
forcefully, such arguments can actually make one feel guilty for
seeking to allow a person, whose life is judged as being of low
quality, to live.
It
is important, however, to be aware of our true motivations in
seeking to define life qualities.
Our aversion to difference and our desire to cast out from
society those who are different may be masked by the language of
'compassion' and 'caring' which punctuates current quality of life
criteria. It is much more palatable to our conscience to express
more self-seeking motives in altruistic terms of compassion and
caring. However,
these hidden motives become apparent when we observe the
differential way in which quality of life criteria are applied
amongst groups of people.
Concern
for the suffering of the family caring for the person is often
cited as a reason for not allowing a person to live.
Such concerns are often raised in the case of newborns with
disability. It is
interesting to speculate whether our community would be as willing
to dispose of healthy newborns on the grounds that their parents
do not want them as it is to dispose of babies born with
impairment on such grounds. On
this analysis, the life of every orphan would be seen as not worth
living.
Let
us look by way of example at one of these criterion - the
'happiness curve' developed by Michael Brandt to judge the life
quality of newborns with disability. This curve plots moments of
happiness and unhappiness around
an indifference axis. The
shape of the curve would determine whether or not the individual
whose quality of life is being judged has, on the whole, a good or
bad life. An
inappropriately shaped curve would justify the withholding of
basic nourishment from that child with the consequences that she
or he would die.
The
able-bodied and able-minded person, who has not developed any
connection with people with disability, is more likely to perceive
the life of a person with disability as full of pain and suffering
(moments of unhappiness). Yet
happiness and unhappiness are extremely subjective concepts which
must differ markedly from person to person.
Happiness is experiential and cannot be evaluated by a set
criteria - for example, that the eating of an ice cream yields 10
units of happiness. To
the person who loathes ice cream, the eating of ice cream would
yield a negative result on the happiness curve.
Even
if happiness were quantifiable, such a basis for assessing quality
of life fails to come to grasp with the very nature of life itself
of which pain and pleasure, whether it be physical, emotional or
psychological, are an inextricable part.
Assessed on Brandt's curve, without the cultural bias which
values the experiences of the able-bodied and able-minded over
others, the greater part of the human race would be candidates for
'treatment to die'.
In
critically and empathetically analyzing quality of life criteria,
one must be willing to take
oneself to the contemplation of what is the very essence of life.
One must be willing to align oneself closely enough with
the person whose life is being qualified to identify and
appreciate his or her inner desires.
We must ask ourselves:
are we really just riding roughshod over that person's
innate desire to live? One must ask, and answer, honestly: in
whose best interests is that person's death?
Is it indeed more comfortable for us, as a society, not to
have to deal with the needs of people with disability?
Quality
or Life - Shifting the
Focus
There
is nothing inherently wrong with making judgments about quality of
life. We judge our
own life quality constantly, almost always with a view to
improving it. Our
reflections on personal and collective life quality motivate most
of our actions in the world. We are constantly seeking to make our
world different, better, more satisfying.
It is this drive for betterment which feeds the inspiration
for personal and social change.
However,
in an industrial society which has come to align social progress
with material advancement, quality of life has become important in
a different context. Increasingly,
we view the world as we view the production line.
On the production line, we discard items of poor quality.
We do not retrieve and repair, but simply discard.
In a throw-away society, we have become more willing to
judge quality of human life with a view to disposal rather than
improvement.
When
we cease to measure quality of life exclusively in order to
improve life, and use quality of life judgments in a mutually
exclusive framework - either
quality or life -
quality of life judgments become powerful social engineering tools
which impact markedly upon the lives of individuals and groups of
individuals within society. It
is in this context that it becomes important to closely question
the way in which we make these quality of life judgments, the
values and beliefs which lie hidden in them and the consequences,
in terms of potential personal and social cost, of quality of life
judgments.
Undermining
Social Equality
Although
our collective social actions may not always reflect it, our
Western democratic tradition is based upon what Richard Sherlock,
in his book Preserving Life,
describes as a belief in the intrinsic worth of each human life,
irrespective of the qualities which it manifests.
Others describe this as the principle of social equality.
However, quality or
life judgments seriously undermine this principle and thereby
threaten the cohesiveness of the society.
By
making human life conditional upon the attainment of certain
characteristics, we are in danger of undermining the finer human
expressions which, according to Sarkar, make the difference
between a culture and a civilization.
Sarkar defines culture as the collective name of different
expressions of human life. Civilization,
on the other hand, is the subtle sense of refinement that we come
across in the different expressions of life.
It is this subtle refinement which makes the difference
between a 'hard' and a 'soft' society, and which allows our
society to evolve and develop more refined ways of interaction.
Applied
in a different context, current quality of life criteria could
easily justify the 'merciful' killing of Rwandan refugees.
They are unwanted, they are bound for a life of pain,
suffering and hardship. The
same could be said of a child born into a family with a history of
child abuse. But as
our collective conscience is raised, we find it more difficult to
justify the denial of the common bonds we share with those of
different race and colour, or of poor socio-economic status.
We would not propose the mass genocide of Rwandan refugees
as a 'solution' to their plight.
Such 'solutions' are not only simplistic, but also
undermine the finer human sentiments which build meaning into a
society. To accept
simplistic solutions is to somehow give up the struggle to improve
the 'lot' of our society. Yet
such 'solutions' are proposed openly and without misgivings in the
case of people with disability.
In effect, they absolve both the individual making the
judgment and the society as a whole from responsibility for improving
the quality of life of the person being assessed
The
fragmentation of our social purview is encouraged by those who,
like Peter Singer, seek to highlight differences between people
instead of the common connections between them.
According to Singer, "not all members of the species
Homo sapiens are persons, and not all persons are members of
the species Homo sapiens."
While his efforts to increase our sense of relationship
with, and empathy for, all living beings is to be commended, his
attempts to draw more distinctions between
human beings is disturbing.
Conclusion
In
considering the maze of ethical issues which confront one in
looking at end-of-life questions, there is a desire to find a
formula, which when applied, will give a predictable answer.
Quality of life judgments seem to offer the hope of such a
formula. But life is
not so linear as we would want it to be and linear analysis brings
with it the scope for results which are definitely other than what
our hearts tell us is proper.
Fritjof
Capra, in his book, The
Turning Point, sums up the intellectual and psychological
shortcomings of our Western scientific approach.
He says that: ".
. . our society has consistently favoured the yang over the yin -
rational knowledge over intuitive wisdom, science over religion,
competition over cooperation, exploitation of natural resources
over conservation, and so on.
This emphasis, supported by the patriarchal system and
further encouraged by the dominance of sensate culture during the
past three centuries, has led to a profound cultural imbalance
which lies at the very root of our current crisis - an imbalance
in our thoughts and feelings, our values and attitudes, and our
social and political structures."
In
seeking a guiding principle, rather than a linear logic, for the
resolution of ethical dilemmas, we need to critically analyse the
decisions which we take in a value-based framework.
We would do well to embrace the principle of social
equality, not only with our rational minds but also with our
hearts, as a benchmark against which to judge our decisions.
And therein lies a greater safeguard in medical decision
making. A principle
lived and absorbed, a close empathy and identification with the
person who is being decided 'about', and a basic respect for the
value of their life, is
more likely to result in justice than the application of 'logical'
principles which, at times, require us to do intellectual
gymnastics in order to fit the logic to the practice.
The criteria used for quality of life judgments fall into
his category; they cannot provide us with just results in every
instance. Quality of life judgments are a very crude measuring
stick upon which to base medical decisions which affect the very
opportunity to live of an individual.
In
basing medical decisions on quality of life judgments it is also
inevitable, as James Gleik in his book, Chaos:
Making a New Scienc,e acknowledges in relation to
attempts to quantify and measure in other contexts, that one kind
of information will be lost while another will be brought into
high relief. It may
well be that the lost information is that which can least be
quantified. But
perhaps it is the finer human sentiments - the sense of
connectedness and empathy, of 'right relationships' which we must
suppress, for example, to allow ourselves to allow a newborn to
die, which really hold the key to the just solution.
References
Boddington,
P and Podpadec, T "Measuring Quality of Life in Theory and in
Practice: A Dialogue
Between Philosophical and Psychological Approaches, (1992) 6(3) Bioethics,
pp 201- 217.
Bonhoeffer,
D Ethics, 1969, New
York:Macmillan.
Capra,
F The Turning Point:
Science, Society and the Rising Culture, 1982,
London:Wildwood.
Eco,
U The Name of the Rose,
1984, London: Picador.
Gleick,
J Chaos:
Making a New Science, 1988, London:Sphere Books.
Heshusius,
L "Freeing Ourselves from Objectivity:
Managing Subjectivity or Turning Toward a Participatory
Mode of Consciousness?" Educational
Researcher, vol 23, no 3, April 1994, pp 15-22.
Kohl,
M "Voluntary Death and Meaningless Existence" in Kohl
(ed) Infanticide and the
Value of Life, 1979, Buffalo:
Prometheus Books, pp 210-211.
Perrott,
C "The Chaos Theory Story:
Explorations of Implications for Education Research", Australian
Educational Researcher, 1992, vol 19, no 3, pp 49-56.
Reich,
W "Quality of Life and Defective Newborn Children" in
Swinyard (ed), Decision
Making and the Defective Newborn, pp 489-511.
Sarkar,
P Prout in a Nutshell -
Part 7, 1987, Calcutta: AM Publications.
Singer,
P Rethinking Life and Death,
1994, Melbourne:Text Publishing Company.
Singer,
P "Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life", Paediatrics,
vol. 72, July 1983, pp. 128-9.
Sherlock,
R Preserving Life:
Public Policy and the Life Not Worth Living, 1987,
Chicago: Loyola University Press.
Wolfensberger,
W The New Genocide of
Handicapped and Afflicted People, 1987, Syracuse, NY:Author.
“Challenges
To the Lives of People with Disability”
Paper
Presented at the C.R.U. Lunchtime Seminar Series
November
24, 1995
Jennifer
Fitzgerald
“A
Death of One’s Own”
A
few days ago I read an article by Andrew Solomon in the New Yorker
called "A Death of One's Own".
That article disturbed me deeply.
I felt a deep sadness as I read.
In that article, Andrew Solomon described his own role in
his mother's suicide. He
described the way in which people are now assisting others to die.
He described two men 'assisting' a friend with AIDS to die.
He described them placing a plastic bag over their friends'
head and securing it with an elastic band at the neck after he had
taken an overdose of sleeping pills.
This was to ensure that his suicide would be successful.
Andrew Solomon writes,
"He
took his pills, and when he was out cold his two friends secured a
bag over his head . . . One of them became frantic, "I can't
deal with this," he said.
"Well, don't quit now,"
said the other. "We're
in this together." At
that point, the dying man suddenly snapped into consciousness.
"Hey, guys, what's going on?" he asked.
They removed the bag and comforted him; he passed out
again, the bag was put back over his head, and he
suffocated."
I
felt such deep sadness because this article somehow shattered my
conceptions of what a loving relationship involved.
Somehow, our value structure has been deeply changed.
An act, which my head and heart tells me is a violence, is
now being reinterpreted as an act of love.
Somehow the boundaries of a loving relationship are being
transformed enormously. If
someone tells me they love me, I now must question:
do they 'love' me enough to want to kill me?
If they do profess such 'deep love', then I think I might
feel a little more than uneasy within that 'loving union'.
But
there was something else about Andrew Solomon's words which
unsettled me deeply. I
saw in his writing a deep struggle of conscience going on.
A struggle to integrate the actions which his intellect and
his ideological convictions told him were right with the very deep
disquiet within himself which had grown since his participation in
his mother's death - something I would call a kind of 'instinctive
morality'. He
quotes a woman who has been through this experience.
She says,
"It is a relationship that is not natural, from which there
is no recovery - you scar forever."
There
was a third thing about this article which disturbed me.
It appeared in the New Yorker.
This tells me that the content of the article has
legitimacy and is probably reflective of the dominant value
structure of a fairly dominant class grouping - the readers of the
New Yorker - who, it is my guess are, on the whole reasonably
well-educated, well-resourced, white Americans.
It
is in this ethical climate, which people with disability are
living. In this
climate, the lives of people with disability are very vulnerable.
Queensland
Advocacy’s Work
What
is now our bioethics project at Queensland Advocacy Incorporated
(QAI), had its beginnings several years ago when people at QAI
began talking more about the sources of threats to the lives of
people with disability.
We felt this to be an extremely important issue and we
wanted to devote more of our time and energy to it.
It took us a few years, but we managed to resource a small
project looking at bio-ethical issues and their impact on people
with disability.
For
the last 18 months, at QAI, we have been grappling, both
individually and collectively, with a range of what are often
termed 'bio-ethical issues' - particularly, practices such as
selective abortion of a foetus on the basis of impairment, the
treatment or non-treatment of newborns with disability, the
various shades and grades of euthanasia (for example,
active/passive, voluntary/non-voluntary).
We also recognize the very real threat to life from abuse
and neglect.
As
you might appreciate these issues are not easy ones to deal with.
I think we have all been challenged by them at QAI.
At times, I feel like I'm wading through mud - and at other
times, it just seems so glaringly simple.
QAI’s
Research Project
Recently,
we felt the need to go further in understanding these questions
and we are seeking funding for a 2 year research project to look
at end-of-life decision-making with respect to people with
disability. It will
be a qualitative research project - basically asking many
different people for their stories and experiences.
The
project aims to give us an understanding of:
1.
Current practices with respect to end-of-life decision
making in the lives of people with disability.
Just what is happening now in those areas.
2.
We also want to understand how those decisions are made -
who makes them - and most particularly, the value structures which
underpin those decisions. We
see that this is very important - for in order to really judge the
efficacy of certain practices, it is important to look at, not
only their effect, but also their motivation.
Our
hopes for this research are that it will:
1.
Make a significant contribution to community awareness of
the way in which we as a society treat people with disability -
particularly in respect of the preservation of their lives.
2.
Second, it is important for us at QAI to be sure that the
advocacy work which we undertake around these issues is informed
by the realities which people with disability face.
Personal
Reflections
Today,
I would like to offer to you some personal reflections which have
come from writing, thinking, reading and talking about these
issues for the last 18 months.
To
me, of all human rights abuses, the threat to one's right to live,
must feature as one of the most basic abuses. At the most
fundamental level, if one's very life is not welcomed by the
society into which one is born, it is very difficult to see how
one will be treated with respect and dignity throughout one's
life. It is this
issue which we are to address today.
It is a very real threat.
Indeed it is more than a threat; it is also a reality.
Yet,
like most abuses involving people with disability, it is largely
hidden within our society. In
the past we have hidden it by
doing it behind closed doors - the closed doors of institutions,
or the closed doors of the gas chambers in Nazi Germany.
But, more often, we conceal it (and conceal it most
effectively) by calling the denial of the right to live other than
it is. So we call it
an act of compassion or an act of love.
We conceal it with medical technologies which distance us
from the reality of what we are perpetrating.
By sanitizing our acts with medical technologies which many
of us associate with health benefit
- medicines prescribed by doctors, or injections normally
given to facilitate health - we convince ourselves that we are
doing good. (Perhaps that's also why Andrew Solomon's words
shocked me so much. I
realized how much I was afflicted by this sanitization of death -
the image of someone suffocating one's loved one with a plastic
bag jolted me into the reality of what was actually being done.
Pills somehow seem so much more' civilized' - and more
distant from the reality of death..
)
The
Threat is Not New
In
one sense, this threat to the lives of people with disability is
not new. We have all
heard of babes with disability being left on mountainsides and
Peter Singer notes a number of cultures in which similar practices
are widely accepted.
This
is something which we, as a human society, are very familiar with
- the inability to deal with difference and diversity.
The darker side of our human history - through its wars,
abuses and atrocities - testifies to the narrow sentiments which
have restricted the
boundaries
of our love - we have created boundaries based on geography, on
skin colour, on gender . . . . and the list goes on.
This, to my mind, is a matter of a huge collective memory
loss. We have
forgotten our commonality - and been dazzled by difference.
This
is the old threat we have long had to deal with.
And, certainly, one that has not gone away.
But threats to the lives of people with disability are also
coming from new sources - and these threats are operating at a
number of levels.
The
New Threats
On
one level, we might focus upon a number of practices, most of
which have their origins within the medical system - for example,
selective abortion, non-treatment of newborns with disability, and
euthanasia. At
another level, at a deeper level, these practices have their own
cause - they are occurring as a result of the confluence of social
changes which are, together, rapidly transforming the landscape of
our society.
At
this time in our history, we are undergoing immense changes to our
value system which have profound implications for the position of
people with disability within our society.
At the same time, we are experiencing rapid technological
changes which are both shaping, and being shaped by, our value
system. It is these
factors which are creating the environment in which those
practices mentioned above are finding scope for expression.
Today,
I want to explore those changing value structures. I also want to
explore the ways in which some of those values are finding
expression in our societal practices which threaten the lives of
people with disability. I
want to raise some questions in order that we might be more fully
aware of where those value transformations might lead us.
I
think for all of us, this period of time in our history is a very
difficult one. Fritjof
Capra described this period in our history as a “crisis of
intellectual, moral and spiritual dimensions”.
And charting the course through this is very difficult indeed.
The
Age of Ethical Uncertainty
We
are living with ethical uncertainty.
For better or for worse, in the Western world, we are
witnessing a breakdown of Judeo-Christian values.
At the same time, the ideological framework which
structured the lives of a huge number of the world’s people -
Communism - has also crumbled.
Some would argue that we are now experiencing the end of
“truth” as we know it,
an era in which the ground rules are open to complete
re-negotiation. Others
might say that we have simply absorbed what we might now term the
Capitalist ethic. The
values which previously only defined our economic interactions -
emphasis upon individual endeavour and freedom of choice - have
now become our ethical code for a whole range of our human
interactions.
The
capitalist ethic embraces autonomy and choice as the only
universal values in a pluralist society - or, put another way -
the only thing upon which we agree in an age of universal
disagreement. I don't
find anything inherently wrong with having choice - we all want
some degree of control over our lives.
The suppression of human spirit experienced by people
living under Communist regimes is testimony to the grave dangers
of seeking to turn us into clones of one another.
But, I feel it is also important that we make ourselves
aware of the inherent dangers in elevating individualism and 'free
choice' to the status of the
dominant social value to the exclusion of all others.
It is important that we know what the wholesale acceptance
of those values might mean for the cohesion of our society - and
particularly, what it might mean for those members of our society
whose very life depends, not upon autonomy, but upon community,
upon dependence and inter-dependence.
Autonomy
I
get a lot of my education on public affairs and values from the
radio. The other day,
Geraldine Doogue was talking on Life
Matters on ABC Radio about parenting.
She said that, for her, the most important goal of
parenting was to create an autonomous individual.
I wonder, where does a person with disability, with high
support needs, fit into this construction of success.
For myself, I would feel that I have failed my children if
they grow up to be autonomous.
I want them to have a fabric of relationships woven around
them to protect and nourish them.
But,
'free choice' is also a slippery thing.
It assumes some sort of state of 'perfect rationality'
which, speaking for myself, I would have to say I have experienced
extremely rarely, if at all.
Life does not seem to be so clear cut.
For example, I am in the supermarket buying washing powder
- exercising my consumer sovereignty of rational free choice.
But, I must question, even in this situation, how free is
my choice. My choice is influenced by the advertising I have seen
on TV, by the colours on the box, by the amount of money in my
purse, even by the fact that my two boys are throwing things at
one another in the shopping trolley - and I just want to get home.
So, how free is my choice?
Then,
I ask: How free is
the choice of a woman faced with the 'choice' of selective
abortion? How free is
the choice of the parents of a newborn with disability?
How free is the choice of an elderly person who opts for
euthanasia because she perceives herself (perhaps subconsciously)
to be a burden to her family?
All of our choices are culturally coloured.
How
also, does individual free choice, deal with the complexity of
inter-relationship - when my free choice conflicts with someone
else's free choice? Is
it the 'free choice' of the one who is strongest which we honour?
Or the weaker?
The
Production Line Ethic
Capitalist
ethics also embrace what I would term a 'production line ethic' -
of perfection (with
the flip side being rejection), of utility and economic
rationality, of control. In
sum, the adoration of what we can see and touch, the material,
over those forces which influence our lives but which live in
non-physical spaces, the spiritual.
So,
for people with disability this means that when we quality control
the human race, it is they who go.
We reject the imperfect from the production line - either
by removing it before it emerges through selective abortion - or
by discarding it after birth.
We
go on to redefine what is a person so that, according to Singer,
those human beings who are not persons, become "morally
insignificant"
and more able to be disposed of.
Just
as we seek to control the production line, we also seek to control
our world. We want to
write our own scripts - with no ad libbing - in order to avoid the
discomfort of chance and chaos.
The
Slippery Slope
Talking
about slippery slopes is not very fashionable these days.
In doing so, one is taking the risk of being hailed down as
paranoid. But, to my
mind, the slippery slope is very real - and we are already on it.
For example, advocates of voluntary euthanasia who insist,
in one forum, that we are only talking about adults who freely and
informedly consent, in another forum, argue for non-voluntary
euthanasia of those who cannot consent - as a matter of right.
Andrew
Solomon, from whose article I quoted earlier, says that
'euthanasia breeds euthanasia"
and notes that 2 of the 4 founders of the Hemlock Society
committed suicide - both out of depression and, suspects Solomon,
a pre-occupation with death
Getting
Closer to Human Essence
Professor
Wolfensberger, in a recent article, made a comment which I found
very insightful.. He
says,
"The
more closely a discourse deals with human nature and the human
conditions, and the closer it comes to the human essence, the less
rationally and truthfully will educated, intelligent people
(including scientists) deal with it"
The
Need for a Wisdom Tradition
To
me, this is the crux of the challenge which we now face.
We have lost our wisdom tradition and, if we are to sort
these ethical complexities out, we need to rediscover it.
I suspect that wisdom comes, not from doing deals on Wall
Street, but from living close to the essence of life, from
treading lightly on the earth and listening to and feeling the
pains and cries and tears which emanate from her.
Vine
Deloria writes,
"The
twentieth century has produced a world of conflicting visions,
intense emotions, and unpredictable events, and the opportunities
for grasping the substance of life have faded as the pace of
activity has increased. Electronic
media shuffle us through a myriad of experiences which
would have baffled earlier generations and seem to produce
in us a strange isolation from the reality of human history.
Our heroes fade into mere personality, are consumed and
forgotten, and we avidly seek more avenues to express our
humanity. Reflection
is the most difficult of our activities because we are no longer
able to establish relative priorities from the multitude of
sensations that engulf us. Times
such as these seem to illuminate the classic expressions of
eternal truths and great wisdom comes to stand out in the crowd of
ordinary maxims.”
Just
as some believe that the visionaries of the future are to be found
on the peripheries of society, I believe that wisdom is also to be
found there. Certainly
these peripheries are places I have gone to in order to seek out
some threads of thought or principle which might help me weave my
way through these ethical dilemmas.
Black
Elk, a holy man of the Native American Sioux Indians, conveyed
this message, "You have noticed that the truth comes into
this world with two faces. One
is sad with suffering, and the other laughs; but it is the same
face, laughing or weeping."
This
desire to root out pain - in the form of age, disability,
dependence, etc - and leave only pleasure - seems to me to be
seeking to control something we cannot.
According to Black Elk, pain and pleasure are like two
sides of one piece of paper.
They cannot be separated.
Try as we may to control it, channel it, tame it, pain just
comes. Our desperate
efforts at eliminating pain deny the basic reality of our
existence. And while
it is natural, out of love and compassion to try to ameliorate
pain and suffering, it is part of life, part of the rules of the
game which are apparently not open to negotiation.
But because we want to control it, instead of seeking to
lend a hand, we seek to knock the pain (or the person) on the
head.
Prabhat
Rainjan Sarkar, Indian philosopher and mystic, writes, “ . . .
all the creatures which have come to live in this world, do not
want to leave it - they all want to survive.
Thus we must grant them their right to remain in this
world, their right to survive.”
Elsewhere,
he says,
“In
human society, nobody is insignificant, nobody is negligible.
Even the life of a 100 year old lady is valuable.
In the universal society, she is an important member - she
is not to be excluded. We
may not be able to make a correct appraisal of her importance and
we may wrongly think that she is a burden to society, but this
sort of defective thinking displays our ignorance.
There is an historical necessity for everything, but we do
not bother to find that historical necessity.
Had we bothered, we could ascertain the historical
necessity behind every incident, behind every trough and crest of
this universe.
If
we think deeply and try to trace the significance of different
events we shall find that nothing in this universe is useless.
Everything is happening with a definite message for the
future, with a great potentiality for the future.
Nothing in this universe is insignificant, nothing is to be
belittled. Atoms and
molecules were once considered very small and insignificant, but
after the invention of atom bombs people started dreading the same
atoms. No one really
knows how much potentiality this or that object has.
One can get an exact idea of the potentiality of something
only after a thorough investigation.
In this world, everything comes to fulfil an historical
necessity."
This
tells me that when someone tells me they want to die, I ought to
ask why, rather than give them a gun or go and fill a prescription
a prescription. To
me, there is something important in us, as a society, honouring
that most basic instinct - survival.
Knudston
and Suzuki describe the world through the eyes of the Waswanipi
people of Canada and find community and interconnectedness, rather
than individualism and isolation,
"In
the Waswanipi world, the web of relationships between the myriad
beings and forces at play is not mechanical
- as is the relationship between the whirling wheels and gnashing
metal gears that "animate" a ticking alarm clock.
It is not strictly
logical - as is the cool, rational relationship between the
lines of a computer program, unerringly incoded in binary digits
and computer languages, that "animates" the screen of an
office word processor. Nor
is it primarily abstract,
intellectual, or theoretical - as are the abstract, lifeless,
mathematical and conceptual models constructed by population and
systems ecologist as they strive to render more intelligible the
wondrous complexities and unities of entire ecosystems . . .
The
relationships among the countless elements of the Waswanipi cosmos
- that breathe life, meaning, and sanctity into it and that grant
it lasting coherence - are more fluid, more elusive, more steeped
in symbolism than what any of these potent but fragmentary Western
images of the natural world is capable of imparting.
Traditional Waswanipi society tends to view the totality of
nature through the same lens through which the Waswanipi people
view themselves: the
bonds of human kinship."
So
they see an interconnected world of relationship - and not a
disparate one of individualism.
Finally,
to Sarkar again,
"Some
people say that disparity is the order of nature, and therefore
there must be differences between one group and another, between
rich and poor, etc. However,
such a proposition is fundamentally incorrect.
Instead, it is correct to say that diversity is the order
of providence. One
must remember that identicality is disowned by nature - nature
will not support identicality. . . So diversity is the law of
nature and identicality can never be.”
So,
in seeking to make uniform the human race, like the production
line, we are in fact, working against the natural ebbs and flows
of the universe.
Ethics
is Not Easy - Not Mathematics or Contracts
Technology
is posing for us difficult ethical questions for us as our
collective dominion over life and death expands.
But, I don't think we get easy answers in ethics.
Ethics is not mathematics - and neat equations and formulae
such as those which some have sought to establish will not provide
us with just answers. Nor
do I think that a contractual approach, an approach with which we
are increasingly enamoured in the Western world,
- such as living wills - will give us just and humane
results.
Rather,
I feel it is in the reclaiming of our wisdom tradition and our
instinctive morality which we will find the answers to thse
difficult questions. It
is also in developing close relationships that protection is more
likely to be guaranteed. For,
I feel out of love comes more dependable conclusions.
Conclusion
So,
in concluding, I would simply like to suggest that perhaps, as we
negotiate the exciting, ever changing, expansive post-modern
world, we should hold firm on just a few non-negotiables so that
we preserve the lives of some people who really matter.
Euthanasia - A Threat to
the Lives of People with Disabilities:
A
Question of World View
Erik
Leipoldt
If
I were called on to give one single piece of advice, the one
considered most useful for men of our century, I should say this
to them: “For
God’s sake pause a moment, think of what you are and what you
ought to be - think of the ideal.”
"The
focus of this legislation is to give those who suffer the right
to choose a death with dignity, to bring to an end the torture
many endure on their death-bed, and for that to be done legally,
without fear of prosecution for those doctors or nurses who may
assist a patient in this desire."
"I
do not consider it wise either to focus on the issue of
decriminalisation or public policy - for the fundamental issue
remains whether it is moral, ethical, right, wise, appropriate,
fitting for the death of a dying human being to be deliberately
accelerated . . . for a very ill person to be killed under some
circumstances, as a part of medical practice.”
"We
shall not cease from exploration
And
the end of all our exploring
Will
be to arrive where we started
And
know the place for the first time"
- T. S.
Eliot
‘Four Quartets’
Thanks
I
acknowledge and am sincerely grateful for the editing of this
article by Jennfer Fitzgerald.
E.A.L.
Introduction
This
paper is written to stimulate debate on the contemporary and
vitally important issue of euthanasia
It will also explore the potential impact on people with
disabilities and upon advocacy for people with disability of
euthanasia legislation.
In
keeping with beliefs underlying this paper regarding the
interconnectedness of us all and the consequent realisation that
scientific detachment and objectivity are therefore myths, I
briefly present my personal background as author of this paper. It
is my belief that doing so will reinforce the impact this paper
may make and this is the sole aim of doing so.
I
am a married man with one child, who for the past seventeen years
has had the condition known as quadriplegia (C 5/6), due to an
accident at the age of twenty-four.
I use a wheelchair and need daily assistance in very
personal activities such as showering, toileting and dressing.
While in hospital for ten months in 1978, the thought of
perhaps being 'better off dead' did cross my mind, but I never
actually sought any means to put such thoughts into practice.
I am today glad I never did, unlike some others I have
known who did take this course of action.
Contrary to the spinal consultant's prognosis at the time,
I consider that my life has been, and is, rich and worth living.
It is difficult at times, but essentially this is no different for
any of us.
Some
proponents of euthanasia argue that euthanasia is appropriate in
instances such as such as "quadriplegia where death is not
imminent but recovery can be ruled out, and suffering is very
severe".
The reader can now appreciate why my explicit subjectivity
in this debate is so important - and that anyone's subjectivity is
unavoidable! Some
people's appreciation of a life lived with quadriplegia is
obviously grossly different from mine.
Can 'quality of life' ever be judged and should it be?
With
the passing of the Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT) in the Northern Territory
and the consideration by the parliaments of South Australia,
Victoria and ACT of various types of euthanasia legislation, it is
urgent that the most vulnerable people in this debate are heard
and listened to. This
urgency cannot be stressed enough.
In fact it may soon be too late for people with
disabilities to make their mark in the face of the Federal
Minister for Human Services and Health, which incidentally covers
disability, proclaiming the importance of the consistency of
euthanasia legislation across States and Territories, as if that
was the most important issue to be addressed in relation to
euthanasia legislation. There
are no proposals for any mechanisms to monitor the impact of
euthanasia legislation on vulnerable people who are older, have a
disability or others.
Definitions
It
is important to be clear about what we mean when we talk about
'euthanasia'. The
word comes from the Greek and literally means 'good death'.
Currently, the term suffers from overuse and is used in
different ways by different people in different contexts.
The term is also used to describe differing shades and
grades of activities - active voluntary euthanasia, non-voluntary
euthanasia, passive euthanasia, involuntary euthanasia, etc.
In
this paper, I rely upon Professor Margaret Somerville's definition
of euthanasia,
"An
intervention or non-intervention by one person, to end the life of
another person, who is terminally ill, for the purpose of
relieving suffering, with the intent of causing the death of the
other person, except where the primary intent is either to provide
treatment necessary for the relief of pain or other symptoms of
serious physical distress, or non-provision or withdrawal of
treatment is justified, in particular, because there is a valid
refusal of treatment or the treatment is futile."
It
is important to note that this definition relies on the intent of
the act, in order to determine whether it amounts to killing or
the provision of good medical or palliative care.
Like Somerville, I will use 'killing' where I refer to the
intentional termination of life to avoid the impression that
euthanasia is somehow a benign moral advance and to reduce any
confusion about the role of palliative care.
While
Professor Somerville's definition does not address the killing of
unborn and newborn babies with disabilities, I will nevertheless
briefly touch upon this subject.
I appreciate, however, that a full exploration of this
topic alone could be the subject of another paper.
History
The
most recent example of government-sanctioned euthanasia is often
quoted as the extermination of non-valued people by the German
Nazi Government in the late 1930s and 1940s.
It
is often claimed that this example bears no relationship to the
current euthanasia debate and
attributes gross criminal and amoral qualities to those who
currently favour euthanasia.
While I have no wish to infer this, I nevertheless believe
that this example has very relevant parallels which we should not
avoid looking at. It is important to understand that side of human
nature which allowed the killing of thousands of humans in recent
Western history and to recognize that, in certain social
environments, that human tendency can gain large scale expression.
Pollard
briefly describes the history of the Nazi euthanasia programme:
In 1895, a book written by Jorst, The
Right To Die, was published in Germany.
In 1920, Karl Binding, a lawyer, and Alfred Hoche, a
psychiatrist, wrote The
Permission To Destroy Life Not Worth Living.
This book led to further discussion which gained further
public acceptance and legitimised euthanasia.
On
request at first, people who were the "useless sick"
were killed in German hospitals. Reasons were stated to be
"compassion, quality of life and cost containment - much the
same as they are today".
Jews were not allowed to use this avenue for euthanasia as
it was considered a social
advance
not worthy of them! People
with intellectual disability or mental illness followed.
Soon after, those with minor defects, people with dementia
and war veterans were included, no longer on request.
Thus, people with disabilities were the first to be killed
by doctors. Then in
1939 Hitler authorised 'euthanasia' for wider use, leading to the
Holocaust.
As
Pollard notes further,
what is important to realise is that this 'slippery slope' had
been prepared by medical doctors, lawyers and clerics, gaining
public acceptance and legitimising later government-sanctioned
actions. Doctors
widely participated in this orchestrated killing and even
volunteered.
The
Past Into The Present
Today
we hear the same arguments of compassion, quality of life and
cost, coupled with the modernistic calls for choice and individual
autonomy to decide what to do with one's life.
In the U.K. the practice of killing newborn babies with
conditions like spina bifida and hydrocephalus is commonplace in
hospitals and there is no reason to assume this situation is any
different in Australia.
There
is arguably little difference between killing these newborn babies
and killing unborn babies before 22 weeks of pregnancy because
perhaps they happen to have a different number of chromosomes.
The same value judgements are at play.
However many of us may now have become conditioned to think
that a 'foetus' is not a baby, a person possessing life.
The same numbing of our judgements and consciences may
happen by referring to newborn babies as 'neonates', robbing them
of their ‘personhood’, and consequently making it easier to
make clinical decisions about their lives, through giving those
decisions an air of professional legitimacy as a medical
procedure.
Government-sanctioned
euthanasia in the Netherlands is often held up as an example for
others to follow, although interestingly some Australian
proponents are now trying to distance themselves from the Dutch
model. A Dutch
government-sponsored evaluation of euthanasia practice found more
than 1 000 official cases of euthanasia where there was no request
for euthanasia by the persons concerned.
In addition, euthanasia is available there to people who
may not be terminally ill. Two
such cases reported in the media concerned persons with multiple
sclerosis and psychological depression who had determined that
their condition caused them more suffering than they could bear.
Genetics
As
a corollary to euthanasia, the mapping of all human genes, the
Human Genome Project, is an expression of the same underlying
values playing a role in the killing of dying people and its
further applications.
Arguments
For And Against Euthanasia
There
are a number of arguments commonly put forward about why
euthanasia should be a legal and freely available practice. There
is one thing both supporters and opponents of euthanasia have in
common and that is that they both argue that what they espouse is
in the best interests of the dying or suffering persons and both
claim compassion to be their deeper motive.
A true sense of compassion is to be respected.
However, the underlying values and beliefs which play a
role in arguments in favour of euthanasia show different
motivations - whether consciously applied or not.
Suffering
And Mercy
People
generally suffer much in their dying and they should 'mercifully
be helped on their way'. It
is claimed that for various reasons the 'quality of life' at the
end of life can be so low that this warrants ending that life.
Reasons
put forward why this should be so include:
·
Pain
and discomfort become unbearable.
·
Most
or many deaths are very painful and uncomfortable experiences.
·
Medical
care is focussing on keeping people alive at all costs which
causes unnecessary suffering.
·
The
final stages of life may reduce a certain dignity, as personal
control over very basic personal tasks and processes may be lost.
Whereas
there obviously are people who die in pain and discomfort,
palliative care in Australia is said to be able to remove or
reduce pain and discomfort to bearable levels.
In fact it has been claimed that where unbearable suffering
cannot be relieved, this is almost always to blame on bad practice
and affects only a very small proportionof
those dying while receiving palliative care.
In
the USA, only 31% of people are only one day before their deaths
on any pain medication.
Assuming that this is so because most do not need such
medication rather than such not being available to them in spite
of need, this is contrary to a public perception that death is
often, if not always, a 'tortuous' process.
Pollard
and Kubler-Ross,
who have each provided palliative care to several thousand
people, both claim not to have had any requests from a patient for
euthanasia after his or her initial fears had been addressed.
Pollard
points to a need for further training in medical schools of
doctors in the practice of good palliative care where such care
may not be available. He also points out that palliative care is
not a field of medicine only a few 'experts' can practice, but to
the contrary, comprises skills which are not beyond the local
general practitioner.
It
is true that medicine can now keep people alive who not so long
ago would have had no remedy for their condition, and would have
died. (This is of course also one reason why there may now be more
people with a disability in our society then ever before).
For example, it is not correct to assume that it is a
regular occurrence for comatose people to be hooked up to life
supports, prolonging an agonising existence.
Such scenes may be more alive in the public's mind than
bear resemblance to reality.
Where these situations do occur decisions can be, and are,
made to either not initiate life sustaining treatment or withdraw
it in the light of futility of further treatment.
Assumptions
about loss of dignity in dying may include needing assistance for
very basic human needs, such as assistance with toileting,
personal hygiene and care.
Many people with disabilities know how a need for such
ongoing assistance affects their lives.
It would be fair to say that, for the great majority, they
eventually overcome any feelings of damaged dignity and learn to
live with it. This is
not to say that such dependency is always a path paved with roses,
it is not. Dependence
however does not in itself necessarily mean a loss of dignity.
Many
perhaps find it hard to believe that anyone could live under such
circumstances, yet many do so with gusto.
We know that the public's assumptions about what it is like
to have a disability do not match the reality of the vast majority
of people who do live with a disability, including severe
disability. Similarly
so, there appears to be a widely held fear of dying based only on
assumptions about what dying may actually be like.
In any case it would seem to make more sense to address the
sense of loss of dignity than to kill the person to avoid it.
The ways in which assistance is given, judgements and
attitutudes by the recipients and givers of care can play
important roles in minimising loss of dignity.
Autonomy
and Vulnerability
It
is often argued by proponents of euthanasia that every person
should be able to control all the circumstances of their own
lives, including when, where and how they die.
This is related to the concept of ‘personal autonomy’,
where one may do as one likes as long as ones actions do not
negatively impact on others.
For
example, Dr. Helga Kuhse, Director at the Centre for Bioethics at
Monash University, arguing in favour of voluntary euthanasia says
that a 'sanctity of life' view is redundant as "only if a
person's
actions cause harm to others is it legitimate for the State to
step in and to bring laws that restrict individual liberties".
However,
history shows that voluntary euthanasia may soon become
non-voluntary and it is here that the lives of people with
disability are particularly at risk.
In this broader context, the acts of one person seeking the
freedom to have themselves killed do cause harm to others by
creating a social environment in which death is an acceptable
treatment for suffering. We
have the Nazi German experience where genocide had its roots in
voluntary euthanasia and more recent history in the Netherlands,
where yearly, officially 1000 people die as a result of
non-voluntary euthanasia.
It is not possible to ensure that the individual liberties
of those who want to be killed today do not become the obligations
and requirements to be killed for others tomorrow.
In other words, the actions of a person requesting
euthanasia could certainly lead to causing harm to others.
Euthanasia,
then, presents a real risk to those for whom society has decided
they are of less worth than others, who are costly to keep and who
are seen as non-contributory economic agents.
People with disabilities and elderly people are already,
almost daily, subtly and unsubtly described as such public
liabilities. Professor
Wolfensberger has pointed out the various ways in which people
with disabilities have been rejected by our society.
He has identified wounds such as rejection, distantiation,
loss of control, deviancy making, social- and relationship
discontinuity, loss of freely given relationships, relegation to
low social status and other.
I
support Somers’ argument that a broader community interest is
served better by supporting life and opposing deliberate killing
than is achieved by promoting the individual ‘right’ to be
killed.
This is particularly pertinent for those who are already
considered as second-class citizen.
It is also pertinent to the whole of society as people with
disabilities play an integral role within it.
There is meaning and
purpose to their presence. Diversity
and difference are vital aids to human growth and development.
As
Pollard
and Somers
point out, it is up to the proponents of euthanasia to demonstrate
that enshrining euthanasia in law will not result in perverse
applications amply demonstrated as serious problems elsewhere.
So far no adequate safeguards are known to be in place
anywhere or to have been proposed by supporters of euthanasia.
Quality
Of Life
Dr.
Helga Kuhse and Professor Singer both argue that it is not longer
valid to apply an inherent sanctity of life principle to all
individual human beings. Singer
says that we are no different from animals and once certain
indicators of a loss of 'quality of life' exist, the individual
loses 'personhood', meaning that person is no longer considered to
be a human being.
'Quality
of life' is, of course, a most subjective concept.
As we have already seen, some people, who themselves do not
have this condition, may consider quadriplegia as unbearable
suffering, warranting euthanasia.
Such quality-of-life judgements require decisions to be
taken about who is worthy to live and who is not.
Yet, it is not possible to judge what quality of life
another person is experiencing and such judgements can at best
only ever be approximations of the reality experienced by another.
Hardship,
a meaningless life, futile treatment, pain and suffering, and the
non-possession of 'higher' human characteristics such as
rationality and self-consciousness have all been proposed as
indicators showing a lesser quality of life.
By such 'indicators', many people with disabilities could
be judged as not worthy of life.
These
'indicators' are most probably among those things people fear most
for themselves when they exclaim, "Oh, I would rather be dead
than be blind, paralysed, deaf, have muscular dystrophy,
Alzheimer's disease”, and so forth.
In our Western society, we would rather take a pill to
relieve any symptoms of a disease than look for any causes and
attitudes within ourselves and address these.
And when something has outlived its usefulness we simply
throw it away. Instead
of dealing with the causes of suffering some would rather
anaesthetise themselves (and others) permanently by euthanasia.
Similarly so, it seems, with people who remind us of our
own vulnerability and weaknesses.
Under the respectable cloak of compassion we have
segregated and congregated them, aborted them, withheld
'life-supports' at birth and now seek to make it lawful to kill
them. In doing so, we
merely address the symptoms of our broken community rather than
address our own values and attitudes underlying such breakdown.
Campion
is cited by Somerville as proposing "that part of the problem
when we react inappropriately . . . to ill or dying persons, is
that we see an example of a life that terrifies us.
We see the patient and ourselves, if we were in the same
situation, as unlovable. This
raises fear of abandonment, because in a consumer society we only
get what we pay for. We
feel that we need to earn love.
If we cannot earn it we will not be given it.
We will die abandoned and unloved, and we would rather be
dead than unloved. Euthanasia
is a way to ensure that we are dead before the abandonment and
unloving occurs. The
demand for active euthanasia would be greatly reduced if we
could alter this perception that love is very tenuous, that it is
conditional and must be deserved".
In
contrast it is remarkable therefore that so many people with
disabilities who have been abandoned and were unloved have
themselves continued to live full lives and give love themselves,
including to those who abandoned and segregated them. It is
suggested that such lives were achieved in spite of, rather than
helped by, our consumer society.
Wolfensberger
points out that wherever there is violence, there is deception and
so it may well be that some bio ethicists and policy makers are
exploiting human fears of 'the other' and promote a misplaced,
public sense of individual autonomy, while pleading compassion.
In reality their quest is open to the criticism that it
appears to be one for a less 'flawed' human race and to achieve
the means to save health and other care costs so that those who
are 'worthy of life' may live well, unencumbered by economically
unviable hangers-on.
Such
objectives are after all perfectly coherent with world-dominant
economic-rationalism where everything is judged according to its
economic utility. And
economists of such persuasion are driving government policies
throughout the Western world, including in Australia, as well as
in former Communist countries like China and Russia.
And Australia is heading for increasing integration into
the 'international market place'.
As Australia does not want to upset such trading partners,
we have now legislated to send back pregnant Chinese refugees to
their homeland where we know that if this is a second child or one
with 'defects', the mother may be forced to undergo abortion and
forced sterilisation.
Instead
of supporting life, euthanasia and related practices by another
name, dump people into death.
Quality of life has then become “either
quality or life".
Sanctity
of Life
'Sanctity
of life' is a fundamentally different concept from 'quality of
life'. It is the
acceptance that life is inherently valuable and has purpose and
meaning even if we cannot perceive that meaning ourselves.
Sanctity of life is the life-affirming principle which has
underpinned our society for a long time.
Not that everyone has always conducted themselves
accordingly but nevertheless it has been our most fundamental
moral societal benchmark. It
is about unconditional love and respect for others and ourselves.
Legalising euthanasia would remove that fundamental
underpinning and replace it with values which would directly
relate usefulness of a life, as seen in the context of our
contemporary society, to a right to live.
For
instance, in the UK the Select Committee Review on Euthanasia of
the House of Lords in 1994
unequivocally rejected any change which would result in the
medical profession's
prohibition
on intentional killing. They
reported that this prohibition is fundamental for our law and
social relationships and protects every individual equally..
Rights
Every
person, it is argued, has a right to 'die with dignity'.
As has often been pointed out in this age of 'rights', you
cannot create a right by merely asserting it to be there.
It has already been said above that the assertion of a
'right to die' may soon become the obligations and requirements
for others. Older
people and people with disabilities may feel obliged to begin a
conversation about euthanasia as they perceive themselves as a
burden to their families and as of limited use to society.
As the media appear to carry stories mostly in favour of
euthanasia stories, it is likely that this is already happening.
Gunning
points out that “respect for life is the basis of our legal
system. Speaking of
life having lost its dignity endangers the life of every
handicapped or incurably ill person.
Since doctors need the confidence of their patients, the
physician should never be given the right to kill a patient
intentionally”.
Depression
It
is well known that depression often precipitates requests for
euthanasia or a wish for suicude.
The depression may result from unbearable circumstances or
mental illness. However,
if a 'right to die' were enacted it is likely that depressed
people would find it easier to find assistance to die than they
would to have their circumstances or illness addressed.
For example, a person in the Netherlands who was not
terminally ill, but who had a psychological problem was assisted
to die, and the doctor involved, while prosecuted, was not
convicted.
This was performed as an acceptable implementation of euthanasia.
Instead of addressing the causes, the person is dumped into
death. This is a
clear example of 'dying
with your rights on'.
It
is noteworthy that among the most outspoken proponents of
euthanasia are organisations of people with AIDS/HIV.
They commonly assert compassion and autonomy as their main
reasons for doing so. In
Holland in 1989, 11.2% of AIDS patients officially died by active
euthanasia.
Some put this figure as high as 23%.
Somerville points out that this
group belongs to one of the most stigmatised and likely to
be abandoned people in the Western world.
She states that in our
consumer
society they are not only seen as “useless products” but also
as “harmful ones”.
It would seem that some AIDS/HIV groups have chosen to
address suffering primarily through accelerated death, rather than
through palliative care. One
wonders, whether depression about rejection by society and loved
ones doesn't play a major role in this approach.
Pollard for instance states that 85% of terminally ill
people develop depression.
Cost Of Care
It
is sometimes argued that it would be
cheaper to kill someone and spend the money saved
elsewhere, rather than continue to pay for care and treatment for
someone who will die anyway.
The Economic Planning and Advisory Council projected that
Australia will not be able to look after its ageing population
without radical measures such as euthanasia.
Dr. Colin Honey, a Perth ethicist has publicly argued for
instance that people aged over seventy years should not
necessarily have access to certain medical treatments unless they
pay for it.
It
is not a great leap from rationing arguments for the elderly to
similar arguments in respect of people with disabilities, some of
whom may already have reduced lifespans.
It does not yet seem to have dawned on these sprightly
octogenarians that regularly jump up at euthanasia forums in
favour of legal euthanasia, that no one is immune from the
possibility of disability at any age or age itself.
This possibility includes their sons, daughters and
grandchildren. Will
they perhaps bear the adverse consequences of legalised euthanasia
within a concept of ethics of which rationing of services is an
exponent, i.e. utilitarianism.
Besides,
Baillie claims that "palliative care can be delivered
equitably and in a cost efficient way, through the strategic
resourcing of small palliative care teams to work in the community
and in hospitals alongside existing health care teams without
duplication.
These models already exist and can cover large populations
of people in a very cost effective way.
Financial
cost of course is important, as any resources are finite, but as
Lickiss says, “The cost to society of keeping some incurable
people alive may be very great.
However the disastrous decade of the 80's in which the cost
to society of the breakdown of business ethics and moral failures
has been so extreme that surely no Western society will look only
at dollar cost when assessing the impact of some practices.
It has been well said that the dollar cost to society of
moral cripples is greater than the cost to society of all the
disabled or incurable people receiving care”
More
than anything though the consideration of cost to support life has
ultimately more to do with what values and priorities we set as a
society, rather than limits of resources.
If one wishes to address the issues of cost, then it would
be more appropriate to look at the causes such as the
symptom-treating nature of our health care system, which will
always, necessarily, be a costly way of treating diseases rather
than people. With
overpopulation, a related matter, similarly, we need to look at
addressing the causes rather than to kill 'excess' numbers of
people.
A
Moral Advance For Society?
Euthanasia
was, as described above, promoted and seen as a 'moral', merciful
advance for society during the early stages of the Nazi German
slippery slide. In
the Netherlands Somerville reports, there are claims that the
highest terms of praise have been applied to the request to die -
this act is ‘brave’, ‘wise’ and ‘progressive’.
All efforts are made to convince people that this is what
they ought to do, what society expects of them and what is best
for themselves and their families.
Calling euthanasia a 'moral advance' could be seen as the
deception Wolfensberger refers to as always accompanying violence.
Morality
is, of course, dependent on one’s worldview and accordant
beliefs. It is worth noting that the Netherlands is a very secular
society and that under these circumstances and an attendant
economic-rationalist approach to life, it is not surprising that
euthanasia is seen as a moral advance.
From a sanctity of life point of view however it is
impossible to see as a moral advance the killing of those who are
dying rather than address their suffering.
Doctors
As Killers
If
doctors would by law be enabled to perform euthanasia then the
traditional role of a doctor as healer would be greatly
undermined. Doctors
as killers can never be trusted as healers and to allow this
situation to come into existence would be a perversion of the
proper aims of medicine.
One needs to ask whether euthanasia could be used to cover
for poor medical practice and whether the availability of
euthanasia could act as a disincentive for improvement of
standards of care.
Legalized
Euthanasia as a ‘Safeguard’
“Euthanasia
is already performed regularly, let us legislate to have
safeguards against abuse.”
When we hear this kind of statement, we should
caution against including palliative care practices which may have
the unintended effect of accelerating death.
As already indicated, this is not euthanasia, but good
medical practice.
No
doubt euthanasia is practiced from time to time by certain
doctors. More
recently three doctors in Victoria have come out to say they have
committed active euthanasia on persons who had AIDS.
The first thing that needs to be said about this argument
is that just because something may be happening regularly is not a
reason in itself to make it legal.
Robberies, break-ins, murder and rape happen regularly in
Australian society. No
one has been proposing that we ought to therefore make these
activities legal in order to regulate and monitor them.
The second thing is that to make something legal does not
necessarily mean that this makes an activity a morally and
ethically correct one.
We
have legislated to prevent people from harming and killing
themselves through cigarette smoking.
It is probably indicative of a confused society where we
have legislation protecting rights to care and support,
legislation which intervenes in people harming themselves, and
legislation which seeks to kill people before their time, all at
the same time.
In
our confused society where politicians are driven by a lowest
common denominator of public opinion (as witnessed in the recent
New South Wales election where opposing parties outbid each other
on who would implement the harshest punishment to criminal
offenders), no safeguards in law could ever protect
institutionalisation of euthanasia as a right for some to become
the obligation for others.
To
date, no credible safeguards have been proposed by the
pro-euthanasia lobby, nor have any been shown to have any
practical value where attempted. This is amply demonstrated in the
Netherlands, where non-voluntary euthanasia is probably practised
on thousands annually. John
Fleming for instance has calculated that 55% of the 10,558 cases
given in the Remmelink Report, where there was an explicit
intention to hasten the end of life by act or by omission ... were
cases of non-voluntary euthanasia.
Fear
Of Dying, Palliative Care And Worldviews
Most
people involved in palliative and hospice care emphasise that
their practice can alleviate unnecessary suffering, that it is to
allow the natural processes of life to run their course and one
may learn important lessons in that time.
They are practically unanimous about the fact that if
palliative care is of a good standard, no patient will ask for
euthanasia. More
often it will be the family, rather than the patient, who asks for
euthanasia.
Dr.
Richard Lamerton, a British hospice director says, "If anyone
wants euthanasia, he must have pretty poor doctors and nurses. It
is not that the question of euthanasia is right or wrong,
desirable or repugnant, practical or unworkable.
It is just that it is irrelevant.
We as doctors have a duty so to care for our patients so
that they never ask to be killed off. Dying is still a part of
living. In this
period a man may learn some of his life's most important
lessons".
Palliative
care is now said to be of such high quality that no one has to
suffer unbearable pain or discomfort.
If a doctor cannot provide this level of care he may be
medically and, rather than pursuing euthanasia, better palliative
care practices - such as the training of doctors - should be
pursued.
Dr.
Kubler-Ross, who has helped thousands during their dying said,
" We are created for a very simple, beautiful and wonderful
life. My greatest
wish is that you will start looking at life differently.
If you accept your life as something you were created
for, then you will no longer question whose lives should be
extended and whose should not.
No one would ask if someone should be given an overdose in
order to shorten his or her life.
But dying should never mean having to suffer.
Nowadays medical science is so fantastic that anyone can be
kept pain free. If
your dying ones can be kept without pain, dry and nursed with
care, and you have the courage to take them all to your homes- I
mean all, if possible- then none of them will ask you for an
overdose. Within the
last twenty years only one person asked me for an overdose.
I did not understand why and sat down and asked him:
"Why will you have it?"
And he revealed to me:
"I don't want to have it. It's my mother.
She cannot take my situation any longer.
That's why I promised her to ask for an injection".
Naturally, we talked to his mother and we could help her.
You must understand that it was not hate which brought her
to this desperate point. It
was simply too much for her to endure.
No dying patient is going to ask for an overdose provided
he is cared for with love and is helped to finish his unfinished
business".
Some
motivations underlying the lobby for legal euthanasia may be based
on an assumption that death is the end of everything; that there
is no point in prolonging something considered as futile and that
if there are at all any lessons to be learned at death, they are
not going to be of use to anyone.
Therefore it is not considered important to 'complete' a
life through dying in its own time.
Any distress during this time is therefore also pointless.
The logical continuation of this rationalisation is, of
course, that our whole life must therefore be pointless as any
learning we do in our lifetime will only be discarded in the big
garbage can of death. This
loss of meaning and purpose is no doubt contributing to the high
suicide rates in the Western world.
In this context and considering that Australia is said to
have the highest suicide rate of young people in the Western
world, it is interesting that we now see a wave of euthanasia
Bills across Australia. As
a country we must be a very depressed people.
A
felt separation from any Greater Spirit, Universe, Cosmic
Consciousness, God, or whatever you want to call it, is endemic in
our Western, materialistic and reductionalist society.
This separation has enabled us to pretend actions can be
value-free and God has been replaced by Science.
Inherent
in this is that we consider we should be in control of everything
and that we alone give meaning to everything around us.
Therefore,
instead of having learning as a main purpose of life, right up to
the moment of death, we try to solve our alienation by making
material comfort the dominant meaning in life.
If our meaning of life is thus restricted to material well
being, euthanasia will seem the logical answer when faced with a
situation which cannot be otherwise controlled and which appears
as a major threat to our comfort.
Singer
argues that the traditional Judeo-Christian approach to life is
out of date and that modern life requires different values to be
applied to life. This
is the debate of 'sanctity of life' vs. 'quality of life' as
briefly explored above. Charlesworth
on the other hand argues that personal autonomy is a Christian
Doctrine, suitable for our liberal society.
Modern science
however has constructed a new worldview which is different from
the current materialistic and utilitarian one.
It has recognized the interconnectedness of everything.
Such a worldview challenges our separate and disconnected
interpretation of life and the events which fill our lives.
These scientists also believe that consciousness preceded
material evolution, whereas I believe the still widely held
existential view is that consciousness arose from material
evolution of life. These
findings are strikingly similar to Judeo-Christian and other major
religions’ teachings. If
one believes every action and being has meaning and purpose and
affects the whole and that a consciousness underlies a physical
manifestation of our world, we have a very different paradigm to
the one euthanasia is founded on.
To see meaning in life, and death, is to lead a healthy
life. This also
applies to a society and its beliefs.
The
different Worldviews have a profound effect on one’s attitudes
towards life. It
appears that it is not the Judeo-Christian and other major world
religious views which are out of date but the views of those
bio-ethicists who are still holding to a reductionist and material
worldview in spite of scientific developments over the last
century.
Whatever
one’s personal beliefs in this area are, the facts about dying
are often very different from the myths held by proponents of
euthanasia. It may be
comforting to reflect on Lamerton's words for those who have lost
a sense of meaning in death,
"Distress
in the last hour is rare and the fear of it is a morbid twist in
our culture. The idea
of suffering may well be projected onto a person by distressed
spectators who are in fact dreading their own imminent
bereavement. There is
on the contrary
almost
always a rather beautiful giving in.
The person withdraws serenely and willingly, as gently as
an ocean liner slips away from the quayside".
Community
Euthanasia
is both a sign of a breaking down of society and is in itself
destructive of community. Its
underlying values are contrary to the Disability
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), the Disability
Services Act 1986 (Cth), the State complementary legislation
and the Commonwealth Disability Strategy.
Legalising euthanasia is directly contrary to wanting
people with differences included, protected, participating and
empowered within our society.
Instead its utilitarian rationale precludes some unwanted
fellow human beings from entering this world, and accelerates the
departures of others. One
argument used to defend segregation of people with disabilities is
that the community, relatives and friends, cannot or will not
extend the love, support and care necessary to live a quality
life. The answer to
that has been that we need to transform attitudes and values so
that we have a more inclusive community which will welcome people
with differences.
This
is the ultimate aim of the above mentioned disability legislation
and of government funded disability advocacy and services.
Instead of putting people away, let us face the causes of
their distress. We
can address these through good palliative care.
Good palliative care is an excellent example of
'community'. And
examples of community have the power to create more community.
Scott
Peck describes four elements of community: Open and honest
communication, accepting differences, dealing with difficult
issues, relating to others with love and respect.
On all four counts euthanasia fails these benchmarks of
community. First,
there is widespread deception about the real underlying values and
motivations for legalizing euthanasia.
Second, the value system behind the legalization of
euthanasia does not incorporate a valuing of differences.
Rather, it removes differences from sight through killing
those who are different because of old age, disability or disease.
Third, euthanasia is a simplistic response compared to the
complex responses needed to address pain, discomfort and
maintenance of dignity while living.
Fourth, it can be argued that acting on the perceived
wants of individuals does not necessarily mean that we
therefore accord that person love and respect. It can be more
difficult and painful to try and understand the distress that
underlies the expression of wants and try to address these
instead.
It
is also clear that the values and practice of palliative and
hospice care are in line with Peck's characteristics of community.
Most people would agree that we all need community,
relationships and opportunities for learning.
In practice, however, this is perhaps often perceived as
too much hard work and we look for an easier way out. Just because
there are easier options does not, however, make them the right
ones.
Somerville
asks therefore whether the ‘easier option’ of euthanasia is
the "final act of love" or an “isolation ritual . . .
expelling undesirable individuals from the collective”.
Somerville
also says that “we can agree, none of us is pro-suffering and
none of us is anti-death when its time has come”.
It is the way we deal with that time when it has come which
sets the telling benchmarks for either a civilisation or for a
'brave new world'.
Implications
For People With Disabilities and For Advocacy
Euthanasia
when not legalised and continuing as a hidden practice means
people with disabilities are of course still vulnerable to being
killed. There are
anecdotal stories from parents who have taken their children with
disabilities to doctors for treatment of non-life threatening
conditions and who received strong hints from their doctors that
perhaps they could offer death in the name of treatment.
Older
people and people with severe disabilities are at risk of
receiving less than adequate care and treatment, potentially
leading to premature death.
Some newborn babies with disabilities are being killed in
hospitals now, either through withdrawal of treatment or
over-treatment with drugs. Amniocentesis
is really only carried out in order to detect a ‘defective’
baby who can then be aborted.
The Human Genome Project attempts to map all human genes
with one of its aims the eradication of diseases and
'‘deformities’ in human beings - a ‘cleansing of
imperfection’.
Illegal
euthanasia can at least be addressed through prosecution of its
performers and such action would confirm the important ‘sanctity
of life’ principle. Mostly
however, we need to realise that the law is not an answer to
prevention or practice of euthanasia.
It is a question of 'community building' in our own
communities - where we welcome all regardless of differences -
which will provide the best safeguards to the right to life and
wellbeing for all. For
it is the contemporary breakdown of community which has led to the
devaluing of life today. Legalized
euthanasia would vastly worsen the present situation and it is
feared that it would eventually lead to killing of unwanted and
‘costly’ human beings, voluntarily or not.
Roy
and Rapin point out that legislation of euthanasia would be
dangerous as it ‘presupposes a world of ideal doctors,
hospitals, nurses and families’.
They see we do not live in an ideal world and that central
arguments supporting euthanasia rest on five flawed premises:
1.
Euthanasia, once legalised and socially acceptable would
remain voluntary and vulnerable and burdensome patients would not
be subtly manipulated and pressured to request termination of
their lives.
2.
We would continue to resist the extension of euthanasia to
those who are irreversibly unable to request or consent to
termination of their lives.
3.
The legalisation of euthanasia would protect doctors
against lawsuits and would minimise the chances of doctors being
brought to trial.
4.
With euthanasia legalised, we would remain a caring
society, ready in times of budgetary constraints to invest money
and resources to develop humanitarian programs of palliative
medicine and palliative care.
5.
We could never, as have civilised societies before us, slip
into intolerable abuses of legalised euthanasia.
Vigorous
advocacy is needed to protect the lives of people with
disabilities as one vulnerable group.
Lickiss for instance has suggested that the A.M.A. should
support registration of personal advocates in patient records or
on driver’s licences in circumstances where the patient can no
longer make their own judgement.
The task of advocacy however, would be not only to protect,
but to draw attention to the necessity of a valued presence of
people with disabilities in our society.
This necessity relates to the interdependence and diversity
which is so essential for a whole and healthy society.
This advocacy would need to be very mindful of the most
pertinent issues for those most vulnerable.
Next
to advocacy there is a need for community builders and
facilitators of community. Inclusion
of all people in community is inherent in this community building.
Inclusion
itself of people with disabilities in school, work, leisure, local
neighbourhoods and other forums will lead to better relations and
understanding between people, if done carefully and over the
longer term. In real
community there is no need for euthanasia because people accept
the inherent meaning of every individual's life.
They know and care for each other.
They will extend to those who are dying, the best possible
palliative care.
Existing
legislation, such as the Disability
Discrimination Act could be tested to see whether it can
protect lives of people with disabilities now subject to killing
before and immediately after birth.
In doing so however, caution should be used as legal routes
are often not those which create community.
The
seriousness of the euthanasia threat to people with disabilities
needs to be fully appreciated by their existing advocacy and peak
body groups. They
will need to understand that to continue to agree to an agenda of
individual autonomy and choice and individual rights may lead to a
physically accessible society for those economically productive
people with disabilities, but where the ‘non-viable’ will not
be supported to live.
Advocacy
and change agents will need to focus energy on those issues which
are most crucial for those who suffer the greatest neglect and
abuse in order to best advocate for the human needs of all people
with disabilities. Such
refocussing may be seen by some as too problematic and difficult,
or even as unnecessary. The
'easier' option will still be to merely advocate for the publicly
'prestigious' areas for which one can obtain the kudos.
For there is no doubt about it that it would
take
a courageous group to understand and face the cost that would
undoubtedly be incurred in taking up the cause of community and
inclusion against the ultimate segregation - euthanasia.
About the Authors
JENNIFER
FITZGERALD
was employed as an advocacy worker with Queensland Advocacy
Incorporated from 1992 until October 1997.
Jenny’s work
focused on bio-ethical issues as they impact upon people with
disability. She holds
a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Queensland and a
Bachelor of Economics from the Australian National University.
She is admitted as a Barrister of the Supreme Court of NSW.
Jennifer is the author of Include
Me In: Disability, Rights and the Law in Queensland.
ERIK
LEIPOLDT is
a long time advocate for the rights of people with disability. He
is currently Convenor of the Australian Advocacy Network and a
member of the Guardianship and Administration Board of Western
Australia. He holds a
Bachelor of Social Science (Human Services) and is presently
completing his Honours. Erik
has had quadriplegia since 1978.
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