The politics of understanding
PROUT
Epistemological Approaches to Social Analysis
INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the Progressive Utilization Theory (PROUT) by P.R. Sarkar
in the late 1950s, there have been numerous efforts to come to terms with
the various implications and applications, and structures and meanings of
this theory. The purpose of this essay is to comment on these commentaries
and to surface in the context of PROUTist texts the problem of inquiry. How,
for example, does one constitute the real, what categories of thought does
one use, and furthermore in what ways is one's method of inquiry related
to or constitutive of the object of inquiry as well as to the discourses
(texts, practices, the social construction of what-is) that frame one's method.
Thus, this is a discussion of various epistemological approaches.1
THE APPLIED APPROACH
There are numerous ways to approach the problem of understanding how one goes
about understanding the texts of Sarkar. The first and most obvious approach
one is used by Batra, Anderson and others.2 This is the method of taking
the categories of PROUT, for example, the PROUT socio-historical category
of varna, as given and then applying them to various historical events. What
emerges is a revisionist history; a history reinterpreted to fit Sarkar's
cyclical-dialectical view of history and its component categories of worker,
warrior, intellectual and acquisitor. For example, in the context of Western
history, the Roman Empire now becomes the apex of the Warrior Era, the rise
of Christianity becomes the beginning of the Intellectual Era, and the industrial
revolution the beginning of the era of the Acquisitors, and the worker-led
socialist revolutions of the twentieth century, the beginnings of the next
cyclical era of Warriors. This approach is useful in bringing new readings
to history and allowing certain structures to emerge that may have been lost
by a particular discursive practice, for example, the rationalist-capitalist
discourse which privileges a dynastic linear model of history at the expense
of structural mythic discourses or the Marxist model of history that privileges
economic explanations at the expense of martial, ideological and spiritual
interpretations.
The problem with the application-oriented approach is that it does not problematize
these categories themselves. How these particular categories came to be important
is unattempted, nor is the worldview that these categories privilege inquired
into. Thus, the categories themselves are treated as given. One might, for
example, ask are these new categories of thought heuristics (typologies that
help explain ideas), ideal types (mental often apriori categories), or inductive
empirical categories (derived from the natural world).
Moreover, in applying a theory of history to history itself, one intrinsically
selects those events and trends, those patterns that fit into one's preunderstandings.
This obviously raises various issues as to the study of history itself; is
there one history, or are there alternative histories that are created or repressed,
that is, is history dependent on the subject, on interpretation and, if so,
how so? Furthermore it can be argued that one's notion of history is constitutive
of one's theory; that history does not exist independently to one's linguistic
structures. Viewed from this perspective, one's theory, preunderstandings are
complicit in the dominant discourse of the present, thus making any objective
history fundamentally problematic. If this is the case, then a serious attempt
at uncovering the politics of one's historical categories, one's theory of
history, is imperative so as to understand how one is structuring history,
to understanding what is being epistemologically gained and lost. Without this
inquiry, one's preunderstandings remain unproblematic and thus uncovered within
various power configurations.
THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The second approach, an extension of the applied, is the empirical approach.
Here the world is divided into theory and data, with language simply describing
the real world, not being constitutive of it. The question then becomes to
determine operational, that is, measurable, definitions of Sarkar's theory.
For example, what are the indicators of each social era? How does one know
empirically when one is in a particular era? Insofar as Sarkar asserts that
those of the intellect and martial psychological wave are reduced to the
proletariat, in the era of acquisitors; from the empirical perspective, the
question then arises how do we define this category, what are valid indicators
for this theoretical construct and how to find reliable and precise data
that measure the above? Finally, to prove the hypothesis correct, alternative
explanations must be disproved, and the results must be repeated by different
studies.
To take another example, Sarkar writes that collectivities are unified either
when they have a common enemy (an anti-sentiment) or a universal common vision
(an ideology). From the empirical perspective, the project would then be to
define collectivities (nations or empires) and then devise valid statistical
measurements of unity and separation and finally to operationalize the notion
of common enemy and common good into real world measurable indices. The problems
with this approach are many. It makes an artificial distinction between what
is being talked about and the language one uses to talk about it, forgetting
that one's empirical categories, operationalizations exist in various discursive
practices--definitions of what constitutes the real that give significance
to one's results. It thus assumes that there exists an extra-linguistic reality
that can be objectively talked about. Also problematic is the assertion that
one's real world indicator is conceptually related to one's hypothesis, not
to mention the problem of gathering reliable data itself, in terms of the categorization,
the collection and the reporting of data itself. It also reduces the significance
of a theoretical formulation to that of a instrumentalist and rationalist perspective,
forgetting the role of the researcher, the interpreter. The empirical approach
also does not problematize the theory itself--except in terms of proving or
disproving hypotheses--nor does it compare the theory with other theories,
except at the level of data analysis. More significantly, the theory as deeper
myth (as a story that gives meaning to basic questions as to the nature of
what is) is denied; the theory as action (in terms of creating a different
world) is denied; as is the theory as vision (as part of a larger project to
critique the present, to develop an alternative cosmology) is also denied.
However, once we see the empirical perspective as a language, a discourse,
then instead of statements that are only meaningful in the context of empiricism,
we gain insight into how a theory might be translated (operationalized in the
language of the empirical approach), thus, for example, allowing for a discussion
on indicators of each particular era without reducing the various hypotheses
to mere measurable indicators. Moreover, given that Sarkar redefines development
to include the significance of animals and plants, that is, an economics as
if all living things mattered, certainly then, for example, in any discussion
of indicators of development the impact of economic growth on animal and plant
life would no longer be an externality; rather, it would be central to the
economic equation.
THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH
The third approach is the comparative approach. In this perspective, instead
of applying PROUT to history or to the future, or searching for measurable
indicators, we treat PROUT as a social movement and compare it with other
social movements such as the Green/Environmental movement. We could also
treat PROUT as a political philosophy and compare it with other political
philosophies such as Liberalism, Conservatism or treat it as a cosmology
and compare it with, for example, Islam or Buddhism.
We can structure the comparison along various categories such as ontology,
epistemology, polity, economy, nature, technology, center-periphery relationships,
and time.
This approach is useful in that a taxonomy of PROUT is developed and we can
better understand PROUT as it now stands in the context of other powerful traditions.
But there exists a significant problem with this approach. This approach is
ahistorical. We are simply comparing one philosophy with another at a particular
place in time. In addition, there exists the problem of units of analysis,
in that, PROUT is in some ways a cosmology, in other ways a development model,
as well as a social movement. Thus, what one compares PROUT with becomes increasingly
problematic. Moreover, this approach does not reveal the structure of the categories
chosen; for example, the categories one chooses for comparison are also an
integral part of a cosmology, of a discourse. The categories economy and polity
have only been distinct recently and the separation of the categories nature
and technology only are sensible in Occidental models of thought. Thus the
categories one chooses are in themselves problematic insofar as they are often
part of the structure of a particular discourse, so much so that one may end
up with a taxonomy which effectively simply compares not two cosmologies with
each other, but the given cosmologies with the silent cosmology that the categories
chosen are themselves embedded in--in this case, the epistemology of modernity.
However, significantly, commonalities and differences can be illustrative in
leading to understandings of PROUT outside of its own discursive representations
and in the case of constituting PROUT as a social movement, useful in attempting
to create strategic alliances in the reconstruction project.
THE TRANSLATION APPROACH
The fourth approach is the translation approach. Here one takes the language
of PROUT, the categories of PROUT themselves and attempts to translate them
into an alternative tradition. For example, PROUT speaks of itself in terms
of sixteen principles developed and articulated in the form of sutras with
accompanying commentaries and constituted in the discursive practices of
the Indian philosophical tradition. We can, however, group them in different
ways. The categories I have used--borrowed from the Western social science
tradition--in various efforts include3: theory of consciousness (ontology,
creation-evolution theory, mind-body problems, layers of the mind), development
model (concept of progress, theory of value), theory of history (social cycles,
dialectics), development ethics (neo-humanism, economics as if all living
beings mattered), and strategy (regional, linguistic social movements).
Alternatively, we can also group PROUT into three frames; critique, eschatology,
and strategy. Sarkar's writing implicitly and explicitly critiques the present
global system and the values that underlie this system, and at the same time
they provide a blueprint and a vision for an alternative vision, a sense of
what could be. Finally, Sarkar provides a strategy of how to go from here to
there.
The problem with this approach is that any attempt to translate involves not
just a problem of syntax, but a problem of discursive practices, that is, a
problem of the deeper values and structures embedded in various ways of thinking,
or "languaging," such that a translation may miss not only the entire
structure of a perspective but critical categories as well. Thus, in a translation,
meanings are regrouped and then re-understood not in the context of the original
text but in the context, in the world, of the translation. However, by virtue
of it being a translation, there is a useful strategic value in that the information
is available to other linguistic communities thus allowing the translated text
to become part of the terrain of these communities. In addition, through a
hermeneutic theoretical move, one might discover various meanings by comparing
the original with the translation.
The empirical approach is similar to this, however, the translation (in the
empiricist perspective) is seen as a vertical effort between the theory world
of ideas and the real world of data, while the above approach is a horizontal
approach between various theoretical constructs.
THE FRAMING APPROACH
The fifth approach is that of framing Sarkar's work through the perspective
of a variety of disciplines. For example, one may frame it in the language
of systems theory. Systems thinking breaks down the whole into a system of
interlocking dependent parts, such that the flows of information between
sub-systems are noticeable. Changes in a sub-system lead often to changes
in the entire system. It is a powerful method to study complexity and interrelatedness.
One could then reinterpret various elements of Sarkar's work as inputs (spiritual
inspiration) outputs (social transformation) outcomes (outputs that feedback
to inputs, struggle). One can then look at the various relationships between
the sub-systems (the spiritual, the organizational, the political) and determine
their contribution to the system and the overall goal of the system--in Sarkar's
language, that of spiritual realization and social change. This goal can
then be disaggregated into subgoals, that of one nation becoming PROUTist,
or social welfare projects completed.
Alternatively, one could frame Sarkar's PROUT in the language of futures studies.
PROUT then becomes an alternative image of the future competing for legitimacy
against the dominant vision of the future, modernity, and along with other
images, the socialist democratic vision, the environmental vision, the Islamic
vision, or the global socialist vision. PROUT, then, is reconstituted as an
alternative possible future. Of course, from the perspective of a PROUTist
worker, PROUT is not an alternative vision, it is perhaps the vision of the
future, or at least, the most probable vision of what is to be. Moreover, from
the perspective of the futures field, PROUT is defined as a forecasting methodology,
as a way of predicting the society of tomorrow.
While this approach is quite useful, the failings are obvious. Any discipline
one might use has its own biases; each discipline privileges a certain discourse.
For example, systems theory simply organizes in a rationalist and functionalist
fashion the components of the system, it does not allow for alternative designs
or interpretations, for example, those possible through a dialectical framework,
or a mythic symbolic one. Moreover, systems theory is a metaphor that makes
certain assumptions as to what is considered the natural state of things (the
notion that every system naturally move to a state of equilibrium, for example).
As a metaphor it exaggerates and hides; certain meanings are accentuated, others
are silenced.
The futures approach, too, is problematic. For one it is ahistorical.
Secondly, critical is the problem of constituting the future in two seemingly
discrete categories: preferred and probable. The probable future is determined
by a variety of forecasting technologies such as dialectics, statistics, cycles
of history, or expert opinion and is phrased apolitically, that is, the role
of subjectivity, in terms of which forecasting methodology is chosen, or the
role of epistemology, one's theory of knowledge, is seen as given. However,
once we politicize the category of probable future and argue that is it is
often a result of problem selection, or methodology selection, or moreover,
one's discursive practices (one's ideology, at a simple level), then the problematic
nature of the distinction between probable and preferred becomes apparent.
Even when the most probable solution is seen as a dystopia, this creation functions
as a warning system, a way of articulating what might happen if one's preferred
future does not result, or if the present continues, then as an objectively
gotten probable future.
Finally, by focusing on PROUT as a predictive social theory, in so far as Sarkar
contends that the social cycle is a law of nature in much the same way as numerous
writers have located Marxist theory, then the legitimacy of the entirety of
the theory falls or rises based on its social forecasting utility; its interpretative
value, its critical value, its value as praxis are denied.
However, the futures approach provides new meanings and allows different discourses
to speak, thus potentially shedding light on that which is to be interpreted.
Moreover, by framing it in the category of thought of "alternative future" it
is somewhat legitimized as an actual possibility of a future society, rather
then fiction. Thus, its theoretical framework and its policy prescriptions
are seen as potentially relevant in the various academic, governmental, and
international development dialogs.
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
The sixth approach is to look at the way Sarkar, himself, constitutes his world.
We begin here with the phenomenological perspective; we are concerned with
gaining insight into the text on the terms of the text. Instead of seeking
to test the text or translate the text, or to refit the text to a "prepackaged" methodology,
we examine how PROUT sees itself. What categories and structures does Sarkar
use? For example, Sarkar develops a six point theory of successful societal
development--spiritual ideology, spiritual practice, preceptor, spiritual
texts, socio-economic theory, and social outlook. With these categories,
we can locate PROUT as well as other systems or movements. Also illustrative
is Sarkar's typology of the failure of theories. For him, the first category
is that of hypocrite's theory, or those developed to serve the interest of
a particular class or interest, that is "to dupe the people,"4
The second is the range of theories that exist without any basis in the real,
with the day to day suffering of the physical world or the possibilities
of the spiritual world, that is, they speak solely in the world of mentalities.
The third is the range of theories that result from a particular culture or
environment, but are however universalized and thus fail because of their generalization.
For Sarkar, the Marxist effort can be thus categorized.
The fourth are those constructs that fail to develop because of implementation
problems: political, bureaucratic or individual.
This approach is highly useful in that we see how PROUT creates itself, we
see its structure in its terms, we see how PROUT sees the world and we learn
from it about the way we construct our world. Thus, instead of interpreting
PROUT, we now engage in the process of rethinking our own selves, our own world.
We uncover ourselves. This process reduces the distances between author, text,
and audience and a multi-layered dialog is created. However, this approach
does not problematize PROUT itself. It does not allow for comparison between
different cosmologies, that is, while this model obviously critiques communism
for being weak on spiritual practice, we do not find out how communism locates
PROUT in its hierarchy of successful movements or theories. In addition, it
is ahistorical in that we do not see the historical context of the various
constructs of PROUT.
The challenge then becomes to see Prout categories of the world as not goals
of an ideal society but in fact as lenses to constitute the world. Thus instead
of using current categories of polity and economy to understand Prout, the
task is to use Sarkar's categories of neo-humanism and varna, for example,
to make sense of what the world is and can be. Prout then becomes not just
a vision of an ideal society but an analytic tool in which to dissect the current
world. This means instead of acceding to traditional political analysis and
thus borrowing neo-realistic (conventional political science analysis) liberal
frames which privilege the nation-state, the task is to use Prout categories
such as varna, prama, neo-humanism and the layers of the mind to better understand,
and thus create a world with enhanced fidelity to Prout theory.
THE POSTMODERN/POSTSTRUCTURALIST APPROACH
The seventh approach is that of the postmodern/poststructuralist. Here we examine
the various structures within Sarkar's cosmology; that is, the linguistic
discourses, the way that it is constructed, the monuments of language and
power in front of us. From this perspective, the goal is to examine the text
of Sarkar and see what discourses or linguistic worldviews he is privileging;
what epistemologies and discourses he is seeking to encourage, and what ways
of thinking as constituted in various discourses he is attempting to make
problematic, to critique. Thus, instead of dialog, we are seeking to distance
ourselves from a typical, that is, mundane, discussion on the varieties of
what Sarkar really means in a certain text.
With this perspective, we gain insight into the structure of Sarkar's writing.
For example, Sarkar is clearly attempting to make the present less concrete
by developing a dialectical-cyclical theory of history. In addition, he is
politicizing the future by not positing an end to politics, that is, a state
when all class struggle is over, yet he embraces structure by arguing that
there does exist a cyclical law of social change. Sarkar is also privileging
the spiritual location and creation of identities and structures by positing
that the end all of existence is spiritual realization.
The critical question in this perspective is not what is real, as with the
comparative approach, but how is it real? How is Sarkar's cosmology constituted?
What are the values embedded in it? Given that language structures are complicit
with the domains of power, we are then not surprised that Sarkar's work is
largely critical of the present and critical of the way we normally constitute
our histories of the present. For him, history is the history of elites. The
stories of the courage of the suppressed have been silenced, the victories
that are told are those of the already powerful: the wealthy, the royal, and
the keepers of the word, the various priests of knowledge.
He is thus critical of the reality of poverty and the poverty of our theories
of reality. We can thus better understand how, Sarkar, for example, attempts
to relocate the self away from our common understandings, that is, the self
as related to status, income, body to a self located in spiritual consciousness
eternally distanced from ego, time and space and at the same time a self located
in all other selves, thus allowing for a discourse that enables compassion
and activism.
For Sarkar, then, the reconstitution of spirituality becomes a defense against
modernity and a purposeful effort to unite in the world with all other living
beings, and thus as an effort to transform the withdrawn self of antiquity
and the segmented self of modernity.
The examples above are only illustrative of the type of inquiry that one enters
within the post-structuralist approach. This is not to say that we should abandon
the other approaches. They too are important in gaining understandings of PROUT.
However, this approach is more enabling in that we better understand the social
construction of PROUT and then create an epistemological space that results
in richer interpretations of PROUT. For example, simply testing PROUT's theory
of history on various civilizations in the pursuit of an objective history
forgets that one has a pre-understanding, and that this understanding is part
of a politics--that objectivity is problematic, with subjectivity complicit
in present domains of power.
Moreover, the post-structuralist approach is complimentary with other approaches
such as the futures or the comparative by providing a larger structure for
critical inquiry. For example, if we were to describe the culture, the political-economy
or the historical place of a particular collectivity like the Philippines,
we can create different levels of responses. The first is to revise Filipino
history in terms of Sarkar's eras, to see how the present has come to be within
the language of PROUT; and at a different level of analysis, we can deconstruct
this revision, that is, the notion of cycles, and we can discover how such
a discursive practice results in various commitments to history, to the present,
and to notions of a good society. In much the same way, the question how do
the writings of Sarkar compare with the writings of great Islamic scholars,
for example, Iqbal, can lead to various types of analysis. One can compare
how they see themselves, how their writings deal with the problem of the present
dominant system of modernity, that is, at their effort to develop counter hegemonic
discourses and, at another level, we can see how they are constituted by present
discourses, and how they have come to be. Thus, the various approaches are
not exclusive.
The strength of the postmodern/poststructuralist inquiry is in focusing on
how power is constituted in the real. Knowledge is thus seen not as neutrally
derived but as central to the political negotiation of reality. Sarkar, of
course, already attempts this when he argues that the type of knowledge interests
one has are largely dependent on the larger power relations, on the particular
cycle in history one might be in.
In terms of PROUT writers, Charles Paprocki5 has attempted this type of analysis
when he argues that epistemology is related to the type of society one is in,
capitalist or socialist, for example. Of course, these efforts have remained
inarticulate to the significance of language structures in concealing power
relations. Moreover, the post-modern approach has not been used to understand
the texts of Sarkar itself, that is to deconstruct PROUT as well.
However, as with all approaches, this perspective too is problematic when taken
alone. Continuous undoing of categories can lead to a paralysis of research
and action, where no inquiry does not move forward because all is suspect,
or because a worldview of postmodern nihilism takes over, wherein reality is
seen as so malleable that the idea of a good society, of reducing oppression,
cease to be possible.
BEYOND DISCOURSE
As important as asking what is after discourse, is - given the above privileging
of discourse, of the argument that the world is created through language,
and that in this imposition, power remains hidden and elusive - the prediscursive,
the realm outside of language. Here we stand in a hermeneutic and phenomenological
stance in that we are interpreting Sarkar's work, attempting to engage in
a dialog between PROUT and post-structuralism. For Sarkar, discursive analysis
privileges the intellect, and reduces the spiritual, the transcendental to
the relative, to a mere discourse. Sarkar, himself, argues for a spiritual
knowledge interest; one that delegitimizes rationalistic qua modernity modes
of knowing as well as intellectual qua mental ways of knowing. Sarkar would
thus agree that the discursive approach is a critically important perspective
and that language does create the world. This is why he and other mystics
such as those of the Zen Buddhist tradition emphasize ways of knowing other
than the intellect. For Sarkar, therefore, the post-structuralist effort
is an activity contained within the arena of mind, the task then becomes
to transcend mind through activities such as meditation, or through koans.
Here the practitioner is forced out of mind; the self then no longer is constituted
in ego, but in itself, in unmediated, inexpressible consciousness. The subject-object
duality does not exist, rather there is a state of the unity of consciousness.
In his words:
That which comes within the orbit of mind is but a relative truth, not an
eternal truth and so it will come and go. Scriptures (texts) and mythologies
are but stacks of bricks, they are only arranged in layers, carrying no significance
or intrinsic value. So how can they describe the Transcendental Entity which
is beyond the scope of the mental faculty. How then can this intuitional
perspective be interpreted, which is beyond the compass of body, words and
mind? Here both the teacher and disciple are helpless, because the subject,
which is beyond the domain of any academic discourse and discussion, is simply
inexplicable and inexpressible. Whatever said and discussed comes within
the ambit of the mind and so it is a relative truth--true today and false
tomorrow. That is why, the teacher becomes mute when he is asked to explain
transcendental knowledge (the Buddha remained silent when asked if the Transcendental
entity existed and equally silent when asked if it did not exist) and consequently
the disciple, too, becomes deaf. So ... in order to explain this profound
mystery, there is no other alternative than to emulate the symbolic exchange
of views between a deaf and a dumb person.
6 The transcendental, then, is the realm of the prediscursive, a space that cannot
be talked of, or listened too, for such an effort would evoke the discourses
of the present, past, and future, that is, the discourses that transpire
because of mind.
The counter response from the post-structuralist position is that the distinction
being made is an ontological one, in terms of what is real. Discursive analysis
constitutes itself by asking how has a particular practice become real, how
has the view of a transcendental self emerged and what are its commitments.
Thus, the purpose is not to engage in an ontological debate as to the nature
of ultimate truth, but to seek to uncover the politics of ontology. By constituting
the real as a discourse, we gain distance from past and present and future
and thus see the real as human creation and thus contentious, that is, available
for negotiation. It is because of the recognition of the primacy of discourse,
and the effort to avoid this location, that both teacher and student remain
in silence and thereby in a non-discursive space.
However, as to the nature of Being, the responses of course would vary. Different
writers might argue that intrinsically, what is, is from the first to the last,
within and without, meaningless, and thus all knowing efforts are projects
of imposition, of the knower. The prediscursive is not the realm of the spiritual,
but the realm of other possible discourses, ways of constructing what is. Alternatively,
one might argue that one simply cannot know the ontological status of what
is.
From Sarkar's view, too, ultimately one can say nothing about the ultimate
nature of being, except that any effort to say anything would be embedded in
mind, in language and structure (time, place and subject), in relativity. The
problem of the relationship between the absolute and the relative then becomes
the key and unresolvable, by mind, issue. For once we define this nature (of
Being), then, we, for the post-structuralist, simply create new categories,
hierarchies, that is, models of existence, or what is commonly called philosophy.
This is unavoidable since after the silence and the muteness, we (the teacher
and student) still must return to discourse and recreate the world once again.
We enter a discursive space; a space embedded in meaning, in language, in historical
identity.
The task for Sarkar then becomes of privileging a spiritual discourse as for
him one's theoretical formulations become better in that they are created from
a non-discursive space that is intuitional; intellect is placed within a larger
epistemological framework. For Sarkar the nature of Being itself cannot be
answered, since "the tongue cannot taste itself." However, through
action commitments, spiritual practices, more of the real can be accessible
to the spiritual aspirant.
Upon expression then the discourse of the present, past, and future, of power
then emerges, for in agreement with the post-structuralist, Sarkar asserts
that once one speaks then one immediately constitutes oneself in mind, and
thus in a particular power structure, in a discursive practice. For the post-structuralist
committed to inquiry and analysis, certainly, the how of that constitution
then becomes the critical and interesting question.
What this means for PROUTist inquiry is that even as PROUT makes truth-claims
about the nature of the ideal social and political system, these claims must
be bracketed in the knowledge episteme in which they were uttered. They should
be understood and applied in their various contexts. This does not mean they
are not "true" but rather that a complex mode of analysis must be
used to understand PROUT and to articulate PROUT policy. Sarkar hints at this
when he asserts that the real is time, place and person dependent.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I have tried to show that there are different approaches to
understanding a particular subject, a text, and that this effort of understanding
is problematic. When we treat texts as unproblematic we affirm various discourses
and our efforts remain bounded by these particular discourses at the expense
of other discourses. Through attempts at inquiry, we can hopefully better
see the problematic nature of our knowing efforts and thus engage in more
enabling understandings of understanding.
The seven modes of inquiry articulated: applied, empirical, comparative, translation,
framing, phenomenological and postmodern/poststructural, must be seen within
a complex framework. It is thus important to note the context of one's research,
one's epistemological biases, and be able to move in and out of various research
perspectives, allowing each to inform the other, not becoming caught in hegemonic
knowledge frame, remaining like PROUT itself comprehensive and complex.
Notes
1. A version of this essay appears in Sohail Inayatullah, Situating Sarkar.
Brisbane and Ananda Nagar, Gurukul Press, 1999. This essay is inspired
by a series of conversations with Michael Shapiro as well as from a reading
of his various works. See, for example, Political Language and Understanding
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981 and The Politics of Representation
Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
2. See Ravi Batra, The Downfall of Capitalism and Communism. London, Macmillan
Press, 1978 and Tim Anderson, The Liberation of Class. Calcutta, Proutist
Universal Publications, 1985.
3. See Sohail Inayatullah, "The Futures of Cultures: Present Images,
Past Visions, and Future Hopes," in Eleonora Masini, James Dator, and
Sharon Rodgers, eds. The Futures of Development. Beijing, China, UNESCO,
1991 and "PROUT in the Context of Alternative Futures," Cosmic
Society (October, 1988).
4. P. R. Sarkar, A Few Problems Solved Vol. 6. Trans. Acarya Vijayananda
Avadhuta and Acarya Anandamitra Avadhutika. Calcutta, Ananda Marga Publications,
1988, 17.
5. See Charles Paprocki, "On PROUTist Methodology," (unpublished
paper, 1981).
6. P. R. Sarkar, Subhasita Samgraha. Anandanagar, Ananda Marga Publications,
1975, 114-115.